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Ban on Nude Dancing Strips Away First Amendment
Rights to Protect "Order and Morality" in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say
it."
-Frangois Marie Arouet Voltaire (1694-1778)
"Freedom of expression is the indispensable condition of all our liberties."
-- Justice Benjamin Cardozo (1870-1938)
INTRODUCTION
The First Anendment to the United States Constitution estab-
lishes the fundamental protection of an individual's freedom of
speech and expression.' However, controversy regarding the amount
of state control over individual expression has spurred furious debate
among judges, legal scholars and the American public. 2 Some feel a
strong emotional commitment to preserving the states' interests in
controlling an individual's actions for the good of society.3 Adhering
to this view, the Supreme Court has given limited protection to
speech which threatens society or possesses limited value.4 Just as
1. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. One could cite an exhaustive list of books, articles and court opinions. See, e.g.,
Marianne Beneveia, Note, First Amendment Does Not Preclude Closure of Adult
Bookstore Where Illegal Activity Occurs on Premises-Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106
S. CL 3172 (1986), 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 382 (1987) (noting that there have been "re-
current attempts to elucidate the true values served by the First Amendment"); W. G.
Roeseler, Regulating Adult Entertainment Establishments Under Conventional Zon-
ing, 19 URB. LAw 125, 140 (1987) (stating that "[c]onflicting interests with equal rights
for constitutional protection must be reconciled."). See also Chuck Philips, Virgin
Records to Strike Back with Free Speech Stickers: The Chief of the Album Label Urges
and Industrywide Campaign Against a National 'Witch Hunt', L.A. TIMES, July 19,
1990, at Fl1. Virgin Records displays a red, white and blue label which reads: "The
First Amendment gives you the right to choose what you hear, what you say and what
you think. CENSORSHIP IS UNAMERICAN. Don't let anyone take away that right.
Raise your political voice. Register to vote." Id.; R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF
FREE SPEECH LAw 1-31 (1990).
3. Justice Rehnquist's view that protecting order and morality is essential to our
nation's survival follows this reasoning. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2456 (1991).
4. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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some fight vehemently to exercise their belief that the government
should protect society from offensive expression, others recognize the
right to this expression as the core of American freedom and democ-
racy.5 This fundamental disagreement over the appropriate amount
of censorship the government should exercise upon its people is at
the heart of the controversy in the United States Supreme Court's
decision Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,6 where the Court ruled on the
constitutionality of the right to non-obscene barroom nude dancing.7
This Note is divided into six parts. Part II examines the historical
background of the First Amendment, including the ways in which
the government has regulated nude dancing in the past.8 Part III dis-
cusses both the historical and procedural facts of Barnes.9 Part IV
analyzes the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the con-
curring opinions by Justices Scalia and Souter, and the dissenting
opinion by Justice White.10 Part V explores the impact of the deci-
sion, focusing on the public reaction as well as the decision's legal sig-
nificance." Finally, Part VI will suggest that Barnes may signal the
current Court's reluctance to find constitutional protection for simi-
lar forms of expressive speech. Also, state courts must take strong
action in order to compensate for this threat to First Amendment
freedoms.12
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment Generally
1. Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates
protection of an individual's freedom of speech.13 The Supreme
5. The Court expounded this fundamental principle in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (stating that "[t]he safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men
speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed
through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government").
For an insightful commentary advocating an "absolutist" view of First Amendment
protection, see Emily Campbell, Obscenity, Music and the First Amendment: Was the
Crew 2 Lively?, 15 NOVA L. REV. 159 (1991).
6. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
7. Id. at 2463. One must note that the Barnes decision did not involve the issue of
obscenity because the State conceded that the dancing involved was "non-obscene."
See also Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1990), revd,
111 S. Ct. 2465 (1991) (emphasizing that the court's limited scope of inquiry focused
solely upon the same issues addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Barnes, not on obscen-
ity or public fora).
8. See infra notes 13-247 and accompanying text.
9. See injfra notes 248-70 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 271-378 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 379-431 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 432-37 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Additionally, under the doctrine of
prior restraint, "the First Amendment forbids the Federal Government to impose any
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Court has established that "free speech" not only protects the writ-
ten or spoken word, but protects "expressive" activity as well.14 This
fundamental right has been one of the most widely construed and ex-
tensively safeguarded guarantees in the United States Constitution.'5
Specifically, the freedom of expression has enjoyed a "preferred" and
more fervently protected position than other rights within the First
Amendment.' 6 The First Continental Congress recognized the im-
portance of freedom of expression in "the advancement of truth, sci-
ence, morality, and arts in general . . . ."17 In addition, the United
States Supreme Court has held that "[t]he door barring federal and
state intrusion into [free expression] cannot be left ajar; it must be
.system of prior restraint, with certain limited exceptions, in any area of expression
that is within the boundaries of that amendment. By incorporating the First Amend-
ment into the Fourteenth Amendment, the same limitations are applicable to the
states." Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 648 (1955). Therefore, the First Amendment also guarantees certain proce-
dural due process safeguards.
The Supreme Court initially applied the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). For a further discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint, see
Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint- The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 11 (1981).
14. Therefore, this Note will use the terms "freedom of speech" and "freedom of
expression" interchangeably. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 557-58 (1975) (holding that "expression" such as a performance of a musical is pro-
tected). See also infra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
15. See Thornhill v. State, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), where the Court stated, 'The safe-
guarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital
to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the process of education and dis-
cussion is essential to free government." Id. at 95.
16. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-96 (1949) (both Justice Reed's major-
ity opinion and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion discuss the First Amend-
ment's "preferred position"). For a discussion of the nature and strength of the
constitutional protection of free speech, see R. George Wright, Does Free Speech Juris-
prudence Rest on a Mistake?: Implications of the Commensurability Debate, 23 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 763 (1990).
The following cases chronologically illustrate the evolution of the "favored position"
of the freedom expression: Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (holding that
the state's power to abridge freedom of speech is the exception, not the rule); Schnei-
der v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (stating that mere legislative preferences
regarding matters, of public convenience may be insufficient to support an alleged free
speech infringement); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941) (ruling that an
abridgement of free expression cannot be justified by the mere likelihood of a substan-
tial evil); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (holding that only the gravest
abuses which threaten paramount interests justify limiting the freedom of expression);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 510 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that
several Jehovah's Witnesses cases refer to the "preferred position" of the First
Amendment).
17. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774) (quoted in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to
prevent encroachment upon more important interests."18 Hence,
freedom of expression has enabled our society to develop ideas with-
out governmental encroachment.i9 The government must preserve
this freedom for society's future growth and progression.20
2. Symbolic Speech
The Court deems activities that do not contain traditional speech
characteristics, but which assert communicative conduct, "symbolic
speech," and generally gives those activities the same degree of pro-
tection as traditional speech.21 Forms of symbolic speech which the
Court has protected include: wearing a black armband to protest the
Vietnam War;22 burning the American flag as a means of displaying
political disagreement;23 participating in sit-ins to protest segrega-
tion;2 4 refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance because of religious
philosophy;25 displaying a red flag to show support for communism;26
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957). In his concurrence in Roth,
Chief Justice Warren cautioned against developing broad standards which "may even-
tually be applied to the arts and sciences and freedom of communication generally
.... .Id. at 494 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
19. As Justice Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927),
"[Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth." Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
20. Id. See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraims, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1961)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating "The Court must remain attentive to the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment, and in particular to the protection they afford to minori-
ties against the 'standardization of ideas'.., by ... dominant political or community
groups.'" Id.) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, rehg denied, 337 U.S.
934 (1949)).
21. Schad, 452 U.S. 61 (stating that live entertainment such as dramatic works or
musicals is within First Amendment protection); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (stating that where the purpose of particular
clothing is to express certain ideas or views, the act is "symbolic speech" inside First
Amendment protection).
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
23. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969) (holding that the government could not prohibit words spoken after defendant
set fire to an American flag, "We don't need no damn flag," under the First
Amendment).
24. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that blacks sitting at lunch counter reserved only for whites was protected symbolic
speech); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (holding that actions of five
African-Americans who refused to leave reading room of public library were protected
forms of speech under the First Amendment).
25. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S.
932 (1943) (ruling that employer violated teacher's First Amendment rights when it
fired her for standing quietly at attention during the pledge of allegiance).
26. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding that defendant's display
of red flag as symbol of opposition to organized government is constitutionally
permissible).
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wearing a jacket bearing an obscene message 27 inside a courtroom to
make a political statement;28 picketing for causes;29 and failing to rise
in a courtroom upon a United States Marshall's command.30 When a
type of expression is challenged, the court begins its analysis with the
presumption that the controversial speech in question is protected.3 1
Thus, the state carries the burden of persuasion. 32
The Court has traditionally afforded protection to the communica-
tion of beliefs with only the slightest redeeming societal significance,
such as controversial, unorthodox, and even hateful ideas.3 3 In fact,
the First Amendment has been used to protect expression advocating
a variety of philosophies, including adultery,3 4 communism,3 5 big-
otry,36 Naziism,37 sodomy,38 totalitarianism,3 9 and transvestism.40
27. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" was protected symbolic speech).
28. The Cohen Court emphasized:
That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense
not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that,
in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual
distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly im-
plicated. That is why '[w]holly neutral futilities... come under the protection
of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons.'
Id. at 25 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
29. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (holding a statute prohibiting
the display of any flag, banner, or device communicating support of any party, cause,
or organization in front of a courthouse violative of the First Amendment).
30. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 660 (4th Cir. 1974) (failure of defendant
to rise upon command of marshall in U.S. courtroom was not "behavior," but rather
symbolic speech).
31. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496
(1986); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
583 n.6 (1983). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 46, 48 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions].
32. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (ruling that state must establish that
compelling state interest justified regulation).
33. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
34. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated, 782 F.2d 1202
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding Virginia's fornication statute unconstitutional).
35. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (displaying red flag to
endorse communist party).
36. National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th Cir.
1972) (holding that state could not forbid use of a public school auditorium for a white
supremacists' meeting because the action would infringe upon right to free speech).
37. See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE
CASE, AND THE RISK OF FREEDOM (1979) (Neier was executive director of the ACLU
when the organization attempted to obtain a march permit for the Nazi party).
38. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th-Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986). Although the court upheld statute restricting sodomy, the parties were
still able to freely express their opinion in favor of sodomy. See generally, Arthur E.
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However, differing levels of protection exist for various types of
speech.41 The First Amendment affords some types of speech little
or no protection because the content of the speech is of low value.42
Obscenity, for example, is not within the realm of constitutional pro-
tection because the Court considers it to lack any social importance.43
Other types of speech which receive lower levels of protection in-
clude commercial speech,44 child pornography,45 harassing phone
calls,46 "fighting words,"47 and defamation.48
Brooks, Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Constitutional, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 645 (1985).
39. See generally Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and the
Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 161, 237-42 (1972) (arguing that the Court should give advocacy of
totalitarianism First Amendment protection).
40. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. 1978) (holding un-
constitutional a city ordinance forbidding a person from wearing clothing of the oppo-
site sex).
41. Stone, Content Regulation, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 194 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Stone, Content Regulation]. "[Tihe Court begins with the presumption that the
First Amendment protects all communication and then creates areas of nonprotection
only after it affirmatively finds that a particular class of speech does not sufficiently
further the underlying purposes of the [F]irst [A]mendment." Id.
42. Id. (noting that some speech possesses such limited value that it is only enti-
tled to marginal protection).
43. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973) (holding that obscenity is unprotected speech). The Miller Court pro-
vided the following three-part test to determine what constitutes obscene material:
a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
c) whether the work, when taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
The Miller test continues to be the standard for determining whether material is ob-
scene and therefore undeserving of First Amendment protection. See Ronald Stern,
Note, Sex, Lies, and Prior Restraints: "Sexually Oriented Business'--The New Obscen-
ity, 68 U. DET. L. REv. 253 (1991) (citing Virginia M. Giokaris, Comment, Zoning and
the First Amendment: A Municipality's Power to Control Adult Use Establishments, 55
UMKC L. REv. 263, 266 n.30 (1987)).
44. See Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762-65 (1976) (holding that the Court gives commercial speech only limited First
Amendment protection).
45. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (holding that child pornogra-
phy distributors are not afforded First Amendment protection); see also Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (finding that state may constitutionally proscribe the viewing of
child pornography).
46. See Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 4 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906
(1975) ("state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting obscene, threatening, and harass-
ing phone calls, none of which are... protected by the First Amendment.").
47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (holding that the state
may limit insulting words apt to prompt retaliation); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (defining offensive speech is that which would provoke others to violent acts).
48. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials).
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3. First Amendment Standards
The government has generally attempted to restrict speech in one
of two manners.49 First, the government has challenged information
or ideas directly based on the viewpoint or message which the ideas
relay. Here, the state may be concerned about the listener's response
to the speaker's message.50 Second, the government has restricted in-
formation indirectly by pursuing other state interests. The govern-
ment has attempted this restriction by either (1) limiting an activity
through which one can convey information or ideas,5' or (2) by en-
forcing rules which disrupt the flow of information.52
As a result of numerous First Amendment challenges, the
Supreme Court has developed a "content distinction" which deter-
mines the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws regulating speech.53
If the government action is aimed directly at the speech or the ex-
pression's communicative impact, the Court deems it "content-
based."54 If the government regulation focuses only on the noncom-
municative aspect of the activity, the Court classifies it as "content-
neutral."55
49. See LAURE:NCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. These governmental challenges have resulted in a plethora of First
Amendment lawsuits. Id.
53. See generally MELVIN B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.04
(1984); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content The Peculiar
Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978) [hereinafter Stone,
Subject-Matter Restrictions]; Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991); TRIBE, supra note 49, at § 12-2; Stone, Con-
tent-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 31; Stone, Content Regulations, supra note 41.
However, the Court has not always drawn a distinction between content-based and
content-neutral speech regulation. See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 121-31 (1981).
54. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457, 459 (1980) (invalidating an ordi-
nance which disallowed "'picket[ing] before or about the residence or dwelling of any
person'" but made an exception for "'peaceful picketing of a place of employment in-
volved in labor dispute' "). In fact, very few content-based restrictions have survived
the Court's scrutiny. Professor Stone has pointed out that "outside the realm of low-
value speech, the Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it
has considered in the past thirty years." Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra
note 30, at 48.
55. TRIBE, supra note 49, at § 12-2. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988)
(finding that content-neutral speech restrictions are those which are valid without ref-
erence to the content of the speech at issue); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41,
48 (1986) (restating that content-neutral regulations are justified without examining
the content of regulated speech); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (stating that "restrictions [are proper if] ... they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech").
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a. "Content-based" restrictions
As their name implies, content-based restrictions focus upon the
subject matter of speech.5 6 Because the government is restricting
speech based on what the speaker is communicating, the Court ap-
plies a strict scrutiny analysis.5 7 The Court refers to this analysis as
the "compelling state interest test."8 Thus, the government must
possess a "compelling" reason when it restricts speech based on its
content, or the Court will deem the restriction unconstitutional.
For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 5 9 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance which pro-
hibited picketing on a public walkway.6 0 The law sought to eliminate
picketing occurring within one hundred fifty feet of a public school
during certain hours.6 1 However, the city ordinance specifically ex-
empted peaceful labor picketing from the prohibition.6 2 Although
supporters of the ordinance argued that it was a valid time, place, and
manner restriction,63 the Court recognized that because it permitted
labor-related speech and prohibited other types of speech, the regula-
tion was content-based.8 4 Thus, because the government could not
show a compelling state interest to support a distinction between la-
bor picketing and other types of speech, the ordinance could not
stand.6 5
Similarly, in Carey v. Brown,66 the Court invalidated an Illinois
statute that prohibited picketing of residences, but exempted peace-
ful picketing of a residence that was a place of employment involved
in a labor dispute.67 The majority relied on Mosley and concluded
that because the residential picketing statute gave preferential treat-
ment to the expression of views regarding labor, it was also content-
56. See Stone, Content-Neutrai Restrictions, supra note 31, at 48.
57. LAURENCE TRIBE, supra note 49, § 12-8 at 833-34.
58. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
59. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
60. Id at 93-94.
61. Id
62. Id at 93.
63. For a discussion of time, place, and manner restrictions, see infra notes 73-94,
135-42 and accompanying text.
64. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 97-98.
65. Id at 100. The Mosley Court stated:
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible
picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a
school's labor/management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picket-
ing is prohibited. The operative distinction is the message on a picket sign....
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, govern-
ment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of
what they intend to say.
Id at 95-96.
66. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
67. Id at 460.
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based.68 Therefore, the Court struck down the statute as impermissi-
bly infringing upon free speech.
The Court often refers to the compelling state interest test as the
strict scrutiny test.69 Under this inquiry, the Court suspends a pre-
sumption of constitutionality.70 Accordingly, the state bears the bur-
den of proving that the regulation serves a compelling state interest,
and that it is the least restrictive means available to promote the
state's interest.7 1 This test reflects the Court's fear of governmental
regulation that suppresses some forms of speech without restricting
others, which could ultimately distort the content of public debate
and destroy society's thought processes.72 Hence, content-based re-
strictions presumptively violate the First Amendment. 73
b. "Content-neutral" time, place, and manner restrictions
While content-based restrictions generally invoke strict scrutiny
analysis, the Court routinely applies lower levels of judicial protec-
tion to content-neutral activities.74 The Court's rationale for permit-
ting a lower standard of protection is based upon the notion that the
government intends to restrict the ways in which ideas may be ex-
68. Id. at 459-60. See also Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951) (hold-
ing that the government could not deny Jehovah's Witnesses a permit to use a city
park for Bible talks when the government had allowed other religious and political
groups to use the park for similar purposes).
69. See Stone, Subject Matter Restrictions, supra note 53. Professor Stone notes
that Courts treat content-based restrictions with greater deference. See id. (citing
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)). See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983) (finding that the state bears the
burden of establishing that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state in-
terest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); accord Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
70. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (noting that state must first establish its interest
in the regulation before a finding of constitutionality).
71. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978), reh'g denied, 438
U.S. 907 (1978).
72. Geoffrey R. Stone, Statement before the United States Senate Committee on
the Judicial Hearings on the United States Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. John-
son, at 4 (Aug. 1, 1989).
73. See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 463 n.7 ("the First and Fourteenth Amendments
forbid discrimination in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that
expression").
74. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985) (holding that inciden-
tal regulations on speech are permissible); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 517 n.23 (1981) (opinion of White, J.) ("the less strict standard of review may
be applied to time, place, and manner restrictions ... ").
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pressed, rather than the speaker's ideas themselves. 75 Therefore, the
government restrictions are less likely to damage the thought
processes within the community or affect public discussion.76
When analyzing content-neutral speech, the Court has generally
used two judicially created standards: the time, place, and manner
test and the incidental regulation test.77 However, at times the Court
has implied that it may be difficult to distinguish between the two
standards.78 Furthermore, lower courts have gone so far as to in-
terchange the two standards. 79 Although these judicial guidelines al-
low the state greater latitude regarding regulation of content-neutral
expression, the restriction must usually overcome three hurdles.80
First, the regulation must be content-neutral81 Second, the regula-
tion must be narrowly tailored to "'serve a significant governmental
interest.' "82 Third, the regulation must "'leave open ample alterna-
tive channels for communication of the information.' "83
75. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688-89 (emphasis added); TRIBE, supra note 49, § 12-2
at 790.
76. But see David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MiLMI
L. REv. 491, 495-500 (1988). Professor Day noted that "the modern TPM [time, place,
manner] doctrine contemplates... that judicial review of such governmental conduct
must guard against the prospect that the purportedly neutral regulations are merely
pretexts for content restrictions." Id. at 498. See generally Michael J. Perry, Freedom
of Ex pression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1137, 1185 (1983)
(censorial versus noncensorial regulations); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban
Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions of Communication, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 779, 785 (1985) (intended versus unintended regulations); Stone, Content-Neu-
tral Restrictions, supra note 31, at 99 (communicative versus noncommunicative
regulations).
77. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (applying
the time, place, and manner restriction test to zoning ordinances); Posadas De Puerto
Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 n.9 (1986) (using the incidental regula-
tion test).
78. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 687-90; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
79. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 536-38 (9th
Cir. 1984), rev'd 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d
94, 97 (6th Cir. 1981).
80. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981) (quoting Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 452 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
81. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 452 U.S. at 771) (concluding that time,
place, and manner restrictions cannot be based upon the content of speech).
82. Id.
83. Id. However, the Court has not limited itself to applying only these two tests.
See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 31, at 48-49. Professor Stone set
forth the following list of seven distinct standards of review:
1. Some content-neutral restrictions do not even "implicate" first amend-
ment concerns [quoting Acara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986)].
2. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are "reason-
able" [quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greensburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131
n.7 (1981)].
3. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if "they are designed
to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit al-
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For instance, the Court applied the time, place, and manner analy-
sis in Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent,84 where it upheld an ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs
on public property.8 5 The Court found that the law was not aimed at
suppressing a particular message.88 Rather, the ordinance regulated
the manner in which a message could be communicated.8 7 There-
fore, the Court concluded that the ordinance was a valid time, place,
and manner restriction.88
When analyzing supposedly "content-neutral" regulations, the
Court must determine whether otherwise valid time, place, and man-
ner restrictions are actually an effort to suppress speech on the basis
of its content.89 For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,90 a lower court upheld the validity of a
school regulation which prohibited the wearing of armbands, finding
that the policy was a valid "place" restriction.91 However, the
Supreme Court overturned the lower court's decision on the basis
that the regulation was merely a pretext for content-bases restric-
ternative avenues of communication" (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (the time, place, and manner test)].
4. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are "within
the constitutional power of the government"; they further "an important or
substantial governmental interest"; the government interest is "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression," and the restriction is "no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest" [quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (the balancing test)].
5. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional depending upon the
Court's resolution of "the delicate and difficult task of" weighing "the circum-
stances" and appraising "the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support
of the regulation" (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)].
6. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they serve "suffi-
ciently strong, subordinating" interests by means of "narrowly drawn regula-
tions designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with
First Amendment freedoms" [quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't., 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980)].
7. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are "necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest" and are "narrowly tailored to
serve that interest" [quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)].
Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, supra note 31, at 48-50 and nn.7-13.
84. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
85. Id. at 815.
86. Id. at 804.
87. Id at 803.
88. Id at 817.
89. See Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 94.
90. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
91. Id.
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tions on student speech.92 Of utmost importance to the Court in
Tinker was the fact that the students who wore armbands in viola-
tion of the school district's policy did so to protest American involve-
ment in the Vietnam War. Furthermore, the district had previously
permitted students to wear political insignia.93 Therefore, the Court
found that regulation was not consistent with an interest in avoiding
aggressive or disruptive actions, but rather school officials "sought to
punish petitioners for a silent, passive, expressive opinion" related to
the conflict in Vietnam.9 4 Hence, the Court held the regulation in-
valid because it acted as an unconstitutional restraint upon the stu-
dents' right to engage in personal intercommunication regarding
matters of political importance.9 5
B. Nude Dancing as Protected Expression
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment protects certain forms of entertainment.96 However,
until the early 1970s, the Court refused to acknowledge even the
slightest First Amendment protection for nude dancing.9 7 As a re-
sult, the Court permitted the states to prohibit this type of entertain-
ment entirely.98 Thus, it was not until 1981, in Schad v. Borough of
92. Id. The Tinker Court refused to apply the O'Brien analysis and instead based
its decision on the time, place, manner distinction. Id. at 513-14. Consequently, the
Tinker decision contradicts the general theory that all symbolic speech cases should be
resolved under the incidental regulation test. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981).
93. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
94. Id,
95. Id. at 510-11. See also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680
(1986) (characterizing Tinker as a narrower decision based upon viewpoint
discrimination).
96. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
("There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment
protection").
97. See Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (stating that nude barroom
dancing may "involve only the barest minimum of protected expression"); California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (stating that nude barroom dancing may be entitled to
First and Fourteenth Amendment protection); Jones v. City of Birmingham, 224 So. 2d
922 (Ala. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970); Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So. 2d 891
(Fla. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 981 (1971); Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City
of Newark, 126 A.2d 340 (N.J. 1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 931 (1957); City of Portland v. Der-
rington, 451 P.2d 111 (Or. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); see generally Lisa
Malmar, Comment, Nude Dancing and the First Amendment, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1275,
1276 (1991).
98. See Jones v. City of Birmingham, 224 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1969), cert denied, 396
U.S. 1011 (1970); Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So. 2d 891 (Ala. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404
U.S. 981 (Fla. 1971) (while holding that barroom nude dancing lacks First Amendment
protection, the court stated that its decision was not intended to "suggest that nudity
or exposure in all circumstances would be violative of this statute"); Adams Newark
Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 126 A.2d 340 (N.J. 1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 931 (1957); City
of Portland v. Derrington, 451 P.2d 111 (Or. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969)
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Mount Ephraim,99 that the Court first appeared willing to reconsider
its rigid stance on the nude dancing issue.iOO
In Schad, the appellants were operators of an adult bookstore,
which also featured a coin-operated machine through which custom-
ers could watch live nude performers dance behind a glass panel.10 i
The trial court found the bookstore owners guilty of violating a zon-
ing ordinance which did not permit this type of activity in the area.1 02
The appeals court affirmed.103 However, the Supreme Court re-
versed the lower courts' decisions on the ground that the ordinance
was not a justifiable time, place, and manner restriction. 04 More-
over, it is important to note that the Schad Court stated in dictum
that nude dancing does not wholeheartedly lack First Amendment
guarantees: 105
(holding that ordinance forbidding females from exposing their breasts did not offend
free speech).
99. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
100. Id. Note that in 1976 the Court indirectly faced the nude dancing issue in Cali-
fornia v. LaRue. See also infra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
101. Schad, 452 U.S. at 62.
102. Id at 64.
The section of the code at issue provided that "[all uses not expressly permitted in
this chapter are prohibited." Id. (quoting MouNT EPHRAIM CODE § 99-4 (1979)). The
following were permitted uses under the zoning ordinance:
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down
dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores,
such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware,
lumber, jewelry, paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery,
pharmacy, liquors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for
shoes, jewels, clothes and appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners
and laundries; pet stores, and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permit-
ted to a group of four (4) stores or more without additional parking, provided
the offices do not exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross
floor area of stores. (2) Motels.
MOuNT EPHRAIM CODE § 99-15B(1)(2) (1979).
103. Schad, 452 U.S. at 64-65.
104. Id. at 76-77.
105. Id. at 66. However, the quoted language is somewhat ambiguous because it
fails to clearly state that sexually explicit but non-obscene expressive behavior de-
serves total First Amendment protection. See id. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring) (foot-
notes omitted) ("[A]nd even though the foliage of the First Amendment may cast
provocative shadows over some forms of nude dancing, its roots were germinated by
more serious concerns . ..").
Nonetheless, numerous federal appellate courts have interpreted Schad as placing
nude dancing within the protections of the First Amendment. See International Food
& Beverage System v. Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing
Schad to support the premise that "[w]e may take it for granted that nude dancing is
constitutionally protected expression, at least if performed indoors before paying cus-
tomers and not in a street or park before casual viewers"); Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County,
793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Schad and Doran as support for its decision
1349
Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech is protected; motion
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment,
such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guaran-
tee .... Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it
displays the nude human figure. "[N]udity alone" does not place otherwise
protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment .... [N]ude
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from governmental
regulation. i 0 6
C. Regulating Nude Dancing
Because the level of protection afforded to sensual expression is
lower than that of political or philosophical expression, 07 courts are
permitted broader discretion to regulate activities such as nude danc-
ing.OS This section discusses ways in which the government has ex-
that topless dancing is "expression, subject to constitutional protection within the free
speech and press guarantees of the [First and [F]ourteenth Amendments"); BSA, Inc.
v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that Schad controverts any
notion that barroom dancing lacks first amendment protection even though it may be
considered "non-expressive" or lacking "any communicative content"); Kreuger v. City
of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1985) ("We are bound to treat topless dancing
as a form of expression which is protected at least to some extent by the [F]irst
[A]mendment."); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing that court could relate purpose of zoning ordinance affecting adult bookstores and
theaters to suppression of free speech).
Additionally, many federal district courts, relying on Schad, have given First
Amendment protection to nude dancing. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 693 F.
Supp. 774, 779 n.12 (D. Minn. 1988) (stating that "[]ive nude dance entertainment is
also protected expression under the [First (A]mendment"); Walker v. City of Kansas
City, Mo., 691 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (citing Schad as support for the
proposition that "[s]ince an entertainment program may not be 'prohibited solely be-
cause it displays the human nude figure,' nude dancing is protected expression under
the [Flirst [A]mendment").
Further, numerous legal scholars agree with this reading of Schad. See, e.g., Susan J.
Rice, A Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial Re-
sponse to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 561 (1988); Virginia M. Giokaris, Comment, Zoning and the First Amendment
A Municipality's Power to Control Adult Use Establishments, 55 UMKC L. REV. 263
(1987); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justtifed?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Alfred C. Yen,
Judicial Review of the Zoning of Adult Entertainment: A Search for the Purposeful
Suppression of Protected Speech, 12 PEPP. L. REv. 651 (1985); Freedom of Speech-Reg-
ulation of Live Entertainment, 95 HARv. L. REV. 211, 231 (1981); Robert J. Shaugh-
nessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1079 (1986).
106. Schad, 452 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-13 (1975)).
107. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (where Justice
Stevens stated, "Even though the First Amendment protects communication in ...
[adult films] .. .from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use
the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification
from other motion pictures").
108. See id. at 70 (commenting that societal interests in the free discussion of phi-
losophy and politics are greater than societal interests in the protection of sensual ex-
pression from governmental invasion).
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ercised its regulatory powers regarding nude dancing.
1. The Twenty-First Amendment'0 9
Courts have generally used the Twenty-first Amendment to regu-
late nude dancing in establishments that serve alcohol.11o Originally,
the Twenty-first Amendment permitted the states to extend their
general police power to regulate alcohol sale and consumption."'
Also, the Court has recognized the Twenty-first Amendment as
granting additional power to states to protect the general health and
welfare of citizens when situations involve the sale and use of
alcohol.112
For example, in California v. LaRue,1 13 liquor license holders and
the dancers who performed on their premises challenged the consti-
tutionality of a statewide law regulating conduct at establishments
serving alcohol. 1 4 The Court relied on the Twenty-first Amendment
109. The Twenty-first Amendment states in pertinent part:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
110. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (asserting that states may use
Twenty-first Amendment power to regulate nude entertainment).
111. I. at 114 (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 337 U.S. 324,
330 (1964) (proposing that the Twenty-first Amendment permits the states to exceed
its police power when regulating alcohol sale and use; and relying upon Board of
Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936) for the rule that the Four-
teenth Amendment cannot prohibit a classification acknowledged by the Twenty-first
Amendment).
112. Id. See New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981)
(per curiam) (favoring state's power under the Twenty-first Amendment over any ar-
tistic merit found in topless dancing). See also Seagrams & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35, 41 (1966) (stating that "Consideration of any state law regulating intoxicating bev-
erages must begin with the Twenty-first Amendment .....
113. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
114. The regulations prohibited the following:
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, of 'sexual intercourse, mastur-
bation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts
which are prohibited by law';
(b) The actual or simulated 'touching, caressing or fondling on the breast,
buttocks, anus or genitals';
(c) The actual or simulated 'displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or
genitals';
(d) The permitting by a licensee of 'any person to remain in or upon the li-
censed premises who exposes to public view any portion of his or her genitals
or anus'; and, by a companion section,
(e) The displaying of films or pictures depicting acts of live performance of
which was prohibited by the regulations quoted above.
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in determining the regulation's constitutionality.115 It is important to
recognize, however, that the Court reiterated that the regulation ap-
plies only to establishments holding liquor licenses."l 6
The LaRue decision created several ambiguities regarding the
states' power under the Twenty-first Amendment."i7 First, the
Court did not address the issue of whether a state must justify
prohibiting nude dancing in bars."l8 Second, the law at issue in La-
Rue prohibited only totally nude or bottomless dancing. Thus, states
received no guidance regarding the treatment of topless dancing. 119
However, the decision in New York State Liquor Authority v. Bel-
lanca120 later resolved the uncertainties left in the wake of LaRue.
In this case, the Court held that states have complete authority under
the Twenty-first Amendment to ban nude or semi-nude dancing in
any establishment that sells liquor.121
In Bellanca, owners of establishments which featured topless danc-
ing challenged a New York law which prohibited such activity where
the establishments served liquor.122 Finding that the law did not act
as an unconstitutional restraint on protected expression, the Court
reasoned that the states' authority to completely ban liquor sales en-
compassed the lesser power to prohibit topless dancing where patrons
consumed liquor.123 Significantly, the Court ruled that a state which
imposed such a regulation need not justify its decision. 124
Id. at 111-12.
115. Id. at 118-19.
116. Id. at 118. The Court stated: "While we agree that at least some of the per-
formances to which these regulations address themselves are within the limits of the
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the critical fact is that California
has not forbidden these performances across the board." Id.
117. For a more detailed discussion of LaRue, see Note, California v. LaRue: The
Supreme Court's View of Wine, Women, and the First Amendment, 68 Nw. U.L. REV.
130 (1973).
118. See Richter v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 559 F.2d 1168, 1172 (9th
Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978) (although there was no showing of social
unrest at a particular establishment, general notion of disturbances at nude bars
within the state was sufficient); Felix v. Young, 536 F.2d 1126, 1132 (6th Cir. 1976) (de-
claring that a rational basis test is appropriate in the wake of LaRue);.
119. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 111-12.
120. 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam).
121. Id. at 717-18.
122. Id. at 715. The New York statute stated:
No retail licensee for on premises consumption shall suffer or permit any per-
son to appear on licensed premises in such a manner or attire as to expose to
view any portion of the pubic area, anus, vulva or genitals, or any simulation
thereof, no shall suffer or permit any female to appear on licensed premises in
such a manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of the breast below
the top of the areola, or any simulation thereof.
N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 6-a (MCKINNEY 1980-81).
123. Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 718.
124. Id. The Court declared that: "[W]hatever artistic or communicative value may
attach to topless dancing is overcome by the State's exercise of its broad powers arising
under the Twenty-first Amendment." Id.
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2. General Police Power
The power to regulate nude dancing does not belong exclusively to
the states. Rather, municipalities may also regulate live nude en-
tertainment using their general police powers,125 regardless of
whether the states have expressly delegated their powers under the
Twenty-first Amendment.126 Under the doctrine of police power, a
city need only demonstrate a "rational government interest" in order
to justify a regulation on nude entertainment. 127 For example, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that increased criminal activity resulting
from the combination of nude dancing and alcohol consumption is a
"rational government interest."128
In Grand Falcon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 29 the municipality of Co-
coa Beach, Florida passed an ordinance which banned nude dancing
in establishments holding liquor licenses. 130 Finding that the state
had not expressly delegated its powers under the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit demanded that the municipality
justify the ordinance.' 3 Using the broad concept of police power, the
city argued that there was a correlation between topless dancing, li-
quor consumption, and criminal activity.132 In fact, the parties repre-
senting Cocoa Beach referred to actual disturbances near local nude
bars, which were similar to those the Court used to support its deci-
sion in LaRue.133 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance
125. See Grand Falcon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 949-50 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (asserting that state may use its police power to regu-
late nude entertainment).
126. When state and local governments regulate land use, they are said to be exer-
cising their "police powers." Some courts have defined police powers as "the power of
government to regulate human conduct to protect or promote 'public health, safety or
the general welfare."' ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2 at 517 (1984) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Am-
ber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) See also Grand Falcon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker,
670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (finding that state may
use police power to regulate nude entertainment). For further discussion of police
power, see ERNsT FREUND, THE POLICE POWER (1904).
127. See Ronald M. Stern, Sex, Lies and Prior Restraints: "Sexually Oriented Busi-
ness"--The New Obscenity, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 253, 253 (1991) (stating that "[a] munici-
pality must show a rational government interest in order to exercise its police power").
128. See, e.g., Grand Falcon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 944, 950 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 950.
133. Id. These commotions included prostitution, indecent exposure and many as-
saults. Id.
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was constitutional regardless of the minimal burden imposed upon
free expression.134
3. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions as Applied to Nude
Dancing
While some municipalities justify the regulation of nude dancing
by means of the police power or the power of the Twenty-first
Amendment, other local governments have attempted to regulate
nude dancing through time, place, and manner restrictions. 3 5 As
mentioned above,136 the United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that for a time, place, and manner restriction to be valid, it
must satisfy a three-prong test.137 First, the regulation must be con-
tent-neutral. 3 8 Second, the regulation must be narrowly tailored
and justified by a significant governmental interest.139 Third, the
regulation must preserve ample alternative channels for a party to
express the interest.140
States have implemented time, place, and manner restrictions on
nude dancing in two ways. First, a state may enforce a minimum dis-
tance requirement between the dancer and the customers.141 Second,
a state may establish zoning laws which regulate the areas in which
134. Id But see Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985), where a
different Eleventh Circuit panel refused to uphold a city ordinance banning topless
dancing on grounds that the city failed to establish the ordinance was enacted to at-
tempt to reduce criminal activity within the area. Ld. at 855.
135. See, e.g., Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986); Inter-
national Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th
Cir. 1986).
136. See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
137. The Court announced the first three prongs in Heffron v. International Soci-
ety for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (citing and quoting Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976)). In subsequent decisions, the Court has promulgated a fourth prong--an ex-
plicit means test. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984)
(stating that "there are ample alternative modes of communication" when the "same
advantages [may] be obtained through other means"). However, one could interpret
this as the "alternative channels of communication" prong. See generally Glen R. An-
stine II, Note, Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expressive Activities in the
Public Forum, 61 NEB. L. REv. 167, 181-85 (1982) (discussing Heffron prongs).
138. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648 (finding that time, place, and manner restrictions can-
not be based upon the expression's subject matter) (citing and quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)).
139. Id. at 649; see also Graynerd v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (hold-
ing that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowable to satisfy a sig-
nificant government interest); accord, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181-83
(1983) (ruling statute unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy a significant govern-
ment interest).
140. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654; see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting that regulation must "leave open ample alterna-
tive channels for communication of the information").
141. See, e.g., Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986).
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nude dancing establishments may be located.142
a. Minimum distance requirements
Primarily, distance requirements shield dancers from being within
the reach of audience members by restricting performers to elevated
platforms.143 The Ninth Circuit dealt with two such distance require-
ments in Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County'44 and BSA, Inc. v. King
County.145 In Key, a Kitsap County ordinance prohibited physical
contact between dancers and customers.'40 While each dancer was
performing, the ordinance required her to remain on a platform ele-
vated at least two feet above floor level and located at least ten feet
from the patrons.147 Furthermore, the ordinance prohibited the cus-
tomers from ti-pping the dancers. 148 The rationale behind the Kitsap
County ordinance was to prevent dancers and patrons from negotiat-
ing for sexual encounters and narcotics. 149
In BSA, a King County ordinance mandated that dancers perform
all nude dancing on a platform eighteen inches high and six feet
away from the customers.150 The court stated that King County had
a substantial interest in deterring public sexual touching and sexual
criminal infractions.151 In addition, the court found no evidence that
the legislature enacted the ordinance specifically to suppress pro-
tected speech.152 Therefore, because the state had a significant gov-
ernment interest in preventing sexual contact in public and because
there was no evidence of an unconstitutional purpose behind the or-
dinance, the Ninth Circuit upheld both ordinances as valid time,
142. See, e.g., International Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794
F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1986).
143. See, e.g., Key, Inc., 793 F.2d at 1061.
144. 793 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1986).
145. 804 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1986).
146. Key, Inc., 793 F.2d at 1061. The ordinance stated in pertinent part that "[n]o
dancer shall fondle or caress any patron and no patron shall fondle or caress any
dancer." Id. (citing KITSAP CouNT ORD. No. 92, § 9k).
147. Id. The pertinent portion of the ordinance stated: "All dancing shall occur on
a platform intended for that purpose which is raised at least two feet (2') from the
level of the floor" and "[n]o dancing shall occur closer than ten feet (10') to any pa-
tron." Id. (citing KITSAP CouNTY ORD. No. 92, §§ 9i, 9j).
148. Id. The relevant portions of the ordinance stated: "No patron shall directly
pay or give any gratuity to any dancer [and no] dancer shall solicit any pay or gratuity
from any patron." Id. (citing KrrsAP CouNrY OD. No. 92, §§ 91, 9m).
149. Id.
150. BSA Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing KING
CouNTY ORD. No. 7216, § 8(A)(6)).
151. Id, at 1111.
152. Id. at 1112.
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place, and manner restrictions.s5 3
In both Key and BSA, the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss the re-
quirement that time, place, and manner restrictions be content-neu-
tral. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has continuously upheld
regulations focused on adult entertainment, even though they were
not technically content-neutral.15 4 For instance, in Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres Inc., 155 in a plurality opinion written by Justice
Stevens, the Court held that although ordinances restricting adult
theaters affected protected communication, they were nonetheless
constitutionally valid.156 Justice Stevens reasoned, "It is [the] secon-
dary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the
dissemination of 'offensive' speech."'157
Additionally, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc.,5 8 the
Court recognized that "the Renton ordinance, like the ordinance in
American Mini Theatres, does not appear to fit neatly into either the
'content-based' or 'content-neutral' category."x59 Although the ordi-
nance treated theaters featuring adult films differently than those
that did not, the Court concluded that the state aimed the ordinance
not at the speech's content, but rather at tackling the secondary ef-
fects of urban blight.16o For these reasons, the Court found that the
ordinance was consistent with First Amendment standards.'6 ' Thus,
it appears that both state and local governments may constitutionally
regulate nude dancing by imposing restrictions such as distance
requirements.
b. Zoning and prior restraint
The state may establish zoning laws which regulate the areas in
which nude dancing establishments may be located. The influence of
zoning laws is a relatively new development. 62 Zoning laws made
their debut in 1916 when New York City passed the first comprehen-
153. Key, Inc., 793 F.2d at 1062; BSA Inc., 804 F.2d at 1111.
154. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976).
155. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
156. Id at 73.
157. Id. at 71 n.34 (secondary effects include deterioration of neighborhood and in-
creased crime).
158. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
159. Id. at 47.
160. Id
161. Id. at 50. It should be noted that Renton, in enacting its zoning ordinance, re-
lied solely on studies conducted in other cities which concluded that adult theaters
contributed to neighborhood blight. Id, at 51-52.
162. Before the tremendous growth of American cities, a property owner had com-
plete control over the use of his land. As urban centers grew, governments enacted
nuisance laws to control land uses which were either offensive to commonly accepted
community standards, or were environmentally harmful. However, as cities became
more complex and conflicting property interests developed between neighbors, govern-
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sive zoning plan.163 New York's law spurred an outbreak of similar
ordinances throughout the nation, and by 1926, more than four hun-
dred cities had enacted similar ordinances.164 These local govern-
ments quickly learned that zoning laws were powerful legislative
devices for restricting land uses.15
The Supreme Court first acknowledged zoning as a legitimate po-
lice power in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.166 In Euclid, a
village enacted a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of an
industrial development. 167 The ordinance divided the village into six
"use" districts, three "height" districts, and four "area" districts.168
The classifications restricted various parts of the plaintiffs' land from
the following uses: apartments, hotels, churches, schools, industries,
theaters, banks, and shops.'69 The Court held that the state's police
power extended to industrial use zoning restrictions. 70 Further, the
Court ruled that it would determine the legitimacy of a specific re-
striction by the totality of the surrounding circumstances. 171 Specifi-
cally, the Court decided that an ordinance was unconstitutional if it
was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."172
ments began to enact zoning ordinances aimed at preventing those problems. See gen-
erall i ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 8-9 (1977).
163. STANISLAW J. MAKIELSKI, JR., THE PoLTIcs OF ZONING 1 (1966). Generally,
New York's zoning plan and other similar programs were responses to the overcrowd-
ing and oppression that tormented their urban centers. See 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.14 (2d ed. 1976). While New York City's ordinance is
generally regarded as the first comprehensive plan, the Supreme Court previously up-
held at least three municipal land use ordinances. See Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239
U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding law barring brickyards within certain locations of the mu-
nicipality); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (upholding ordinance forbid-
ding livery stables from designated areas of town); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)
(upholding law dividing Boston into two sections with varying building height
restrictions).
164. NELSON, suPra note 162, at 9. The number of cities that passed ordinances rep-
resented over half of the United States' urban population. Id.
165. For an in-depth discussion of zoning ordinances and their uses, see Kenneth
Pearlman, Zoning and the First Amendment, 16 URB. LAW. 217 (1984) (discussing
traditional zoning challenges as they relate to "reasonableness" and "taking" issues).
166. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
167. Id. at 379-80.
168. Id. at 380.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 387-88.
171. Id. at 388. The Court stated that "the question of whether the power exists to
forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use ... is to be
determined... by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the local-
ity." Id
172. Id. at 395.
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Thus, under this analysis, "quality of life" is a material interest that a
community can attempt to control through the use of zoning
ordinances. 7 3
While only limited case law directly addresses the nude dancing is-
sue, courts have decided many cases involving "adult-use establish-
ments" such as adult bookstores, adult theaters, and other forms of
adult entertainment.174 As a general rule, the constitutional stan-
dards set forth in these cases are applicable to zoning laws regulating
nude dancing.175 The following section discusses five prominent
cases in which the Court analyzed the restrictions imposed upon
adult-use establishments through zoning. 76
1. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
In 1973, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,177 the Supreme Court
first recognized that a government interest may justify prohibiting an
individual from using his property to display obscene materials. 7 8 In
Paris Adult Theatre, the local Georgia district attorney attempted to
prevent two Atlanta movie theaters from showing obscene films.1 7 9
The theater posted a sign on its door limiting entrance to those per-
sons over twenty-one years of age.l8 0 The Court began its analysis
noting that states have legitimate interests in regulating "commercial
obscenity."181 Such interests include "the quality of life and the total
173. However, this type of power is by no means absolute. See Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (articulating that the interference must be substantially
related to the community's health, safety, morals or general welfare). But see Com-
ment, Developments in the Law of Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1427, 1451 n.65 (1978) (cit-
ing further examples of cases supporting the use of zoning to obtain an overall "use"
goal of a locality).
174. See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (rul-
ing that ordinance restricting adult entertainment establishment locations did not vio-
late constitution).
175. Id. (analyzing constitutionality of zoning ordinance which regulated topless
cabarets and other adult entertainment establishments).
176. For a thorough discussion of the First Amendment issues raised when govern-
mental bodies use zoning to regulate adult establishments, see generally Edmund J.
Postawko, Recent Developments, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Or-
dinances Regulating Adult Establishments, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315,
328-29 (1986).
177. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
178. Id. at 57-59.
179. Id. at 51. The Supreme Court characterized two films, Magic Mirror and It All
Comes Out in the End, as "hard core pornography." Id. at 51-52. See generally Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that private possession of obscene materi-
als is not a criminal act).
180. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 52.
181. Id. at 57. But see id at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Brennan stated that because the process of defining obscenity is considerably vague,
the result may be the chilling of protected speech. Id. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan felt that although states have the authority to consider the commu-
nity's best interest, the interest in suppressing obscenity is weak. Id. (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). He concluded that "at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or
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community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city cen-
ters, and, possibly, the public safety itself."' 82 The Court based its
ruling in part on the assumption that there is a connection between
obscenity and criminal activity. 83 The Court held that the states
have a legitimate interest in regulating obscene materials, and that
restricting admission to consenting adults did not ensure constitu-
tional protection.'8 4 Further, the Court held that states can regulate
the exhibition of an allegedly obscene film as long as the regulation
meets the standards set forth in Miller v. California.185
In Miller, the Supreme Court set forth a three-part obscenity test.
Under the Miller standard, a work is subject to regulation if 1) it ap-
peals to the prurient interest when an average person of the commu-
nity considers the work as a whole; 2) it depicts or describes in a
patently offensive manner certain sexual conduct as defined by state
law; and 3) it "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 86
obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexu-
ally oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents." Id. (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 58.
183. Id To support its theory, the Court cited the Hill-Link Minority Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, which indicates that there is an "arguable
correlation" between obscene materials and crime. Id. See also Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), in which Justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion, stated:
While erotic stimulation caused by pornography may be legally insignificant
in itself, there are medical experts who believe that such stimulation fre-
quently manifests itself in criminal sexual behavior or other antisocial con-
duct . . . . [o]bscenity, with its exaggerated and morbid emphasis on sex,
particularly abnormal and perverted practices, and its unrealistic presentation
of sexual behavior and attitudes, may induce antisocial conduct by the average
person.
Id. at 452 (Clark, J., dissenting).
184. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 68-69. The Court explicitly rejected the argu-
ment that obscene materials were protected by the fundamental right of privacy. Id at
66.
185. 413 U.S. 15, rehg denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). The Paris Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court for proceedings con-
sistent with Miller v. California, which was decided on the same day as Paris Adult
Theatre. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 69.
186. Miller, 413 U.S at 24. But see State v. Henry, 717 P.2d 189, 196-97 (1986) (ruling
that an obscenity statute patterned after the Miller standard was unconstitutionally
vague). For a further discussion of the vagueness doctrine see infra notes 220-31 and
accompanying text. See also Robert E. Riggs, Miller v. California Revisited: An Em-
pirical Note, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 247-73 (1981) (discussing Miller's effects on ob-
scenity law since 1973).
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2. Young v. American Mini Theatres
The Paris decision set the stage for Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres.18 7 The dispute in Young focused upon two Detroit "anti-Skid
Row" ordinances. 8 8 The ordinances required the dispersion of adult
establishmentslS9 by prohibiting them from being located within one
thousand feet of any other such establishment, or within five hun-
dred feet of a residential area.190 Two theater owners challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinances. 19 1 The Court held that Detroit
could use its zoning laws to regulate the locations of commercial es-
tablishments.192 Additionally, the Court stated that "[t]he city's in-
terest in planning and regulating the use of property for commercial
purposes is clearly adequate to support that kind of restriction appli-
cable to all theaters within the city limits."19 3 Further, although the
Court did not classify the ordinances strictly as "content-neutral," it
determined that the ordinances were "viewpoint-neutral" because
they did not prefer one viewpoint over another.194
The Young Court also noted that the objective of avoiding the sec-
ondary effects affiliated with sexually oriented establishments was
significant enough to justify the lower degree of First Amendment
protection.195 However, the Court acknowledged that if the ordi-
nance had suppressed or greatly inhibited access to this type of ex-
pression, the outcome of the case might have been different.19 6
Nonetheless, the Young decision established that a city government
187. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For further discussion of Young, see Cynthia D. Stevenin,
Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected Speech, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321, 351 (1977); and David Gold, Note, Equal Protection and the
First Amendment Zoning Away Skid Row, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 713 (1977).
188. DETROIT, MICH. ORDINANCE §§ 742.G-743.G (1972).
189. The Court defined adult establishments as uses characterized or distinguished
by emphasizing matters depicting, describing, or relating to "Specified Sexual Activi-
ties" or "Specified Anatomical Areas." Young, 427 U.S. at 53.
190. Id. at 52.
191. Id. at 55.
192. Id. at 62-63.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 70.
195. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. Justice Stevens stated:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it
is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate ....
Id.
196. Id. at 71 n.35. The Court recognized the district court's findings that the ordi-
nance did not affect existing establishments, but rather applied only to new businesses.
Id. The district court stated, "There are myriad locations in the City of Detroit which
must be over one thousand feet from existing regulated establishments. This burden
on First Amendment rights is slight." Nortown Theatre v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363,
370 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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may use its zoning power to restrict adult use establishnents.197
3. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim
Five years later, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,198 the
Court struck down a zoning ordinance which prohibited all live en-
tertainment, including nude dancing, in specific commercial loca-
tions.199 The Court held that zoning ordinances must be narrowly
drawn and must further a significant government interest in order to
justify an infringement upon First Amendment rights.200 The ordi-
nance at issue in Schad instituted a total ban on adult entertainment.
Thus, the Court determined that such a sweeping regulation pre-
cluded alternative channels of communication, and therefore acted as
an unconstitutional restriction on free expression. 01
197. Nevertheless, the Young decision has been the subject of much criticism since
its birth. In his dissent, Justice Stewart disagreed with the plurality's opinion that
erotic types of speech deserve a lower degree of protection. According to Justice Stew-
art, although the offensive speech does not address important political or social con-
cerns, that "does not mean that it is less worthy of constitutional protection." Young,
427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also TRIBE, supra note 49, at 954 (proclaim-
ing that Young was decided incorrectly because the plurality opinion should have ana-
lyzed the case as a content-based issue, instead of a content-neutral (viewpoint-
neutral) matter); Kevin D. McDonald, Note, Constitutional Law--First Amendment-
Content-Neutrality, 28 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 456, 490 (1978) ("It must be concluded
that under these standards Young v. American Mini Theatres is a jurisprudential
mess.").
198. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
199. Id. at 65. The government filed complaints which accused the bookstore of vio-
lating section 99-15b of Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance. The ordinance described
the permitted uses in a commercial zone as follows:
Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings. (1) Offices and Banks;
taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners only and with no
drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited to
food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint,
wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, liquors,
cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for shoes, jewels, clothes
and appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and launderies; pet
stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permitted to a group of four
(4) stores or more without additional parking, provided the offices do not ex-
ceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the
stores. (2) Motels.
MouNT EPHRAIM CODE § 99-15b 1, 2 (1979).
200. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68; see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
499-500 (1977) (holding that ordinance which restricted occupancy of dwelling to mem-
bers of a single family was unconstitutional). Because an ordinance defined "family"
in terms that prevented extended family members from living together, it acted as an
unconstitutional infringement upon protected liberty interests; cf. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance regulating land use
for single-family units because it only affected unrelated persons).
201. Schad, 452 U.S. at 75-76. Because the ordinance completely banned all live en-
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4. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
In 1986, the Court again addressed the constitutionality of an adult
entertainment zoning ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres.202 The Court in Renton rejected a First Amendment challenge
to a zoning ordinance which prohibited adult motion picture theaters
from locating within one thousand feet of any residential zone, fam-
ily dwelling, church, or park, or within one mile of any school.20 3
The Court noted that because "[t]he Renton ordinance .. .does not
ban adult move theaters altogether,... [it] is therefore properly ana-
lyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation."204 Although
the plain language of the ordinance demonstrated that it only applied
to speech of a particular content, the Court treated the ordinance as
content-neutral, asserting that the city aimed the ordinance "not at
the content of the films shown 'at adult motion picture theaters,' but
rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding
community." 20 5
The Court also approved of the city's reliance upon empirical data
from other municipalities concerning the adverse effects of adult en-
tertainment establishments to justify the ordinance.20 6 Thus, the
Court did not require the City of Renton to demonstrate a specific
need for the ordinance within its own boundaries.207 Finally, the
Court held that Renton had left open sufficient "alternative avenues
tertainment from the area, the holding was not applicable in Young. Rather, the ordi-
nance in Schad resembled laws described by Justice Blackmun in Young which have
"the effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access to lawful speech." Young v.
American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35. (1976). See also Schad, 452 U.S. at 78
(Blackmun, J., concurring), where Justice Blackmun stated:
It would be a substantial step beyond [Young] Mini Theatres to conclude that
a town or county may legislatively prevent its citizens from engaging in or
having access to forms of protected expression that are incompatible with its
majority's conception of the 'decent life' solely because these activities are suf-
ficiently available in other locales.
202. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). For a further discussion of Renton and its importance in
the area of zoning law, see Alan C. Weinstein, The Renton Decision: A New Standard
for Adult Business Regulation, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 91 (1987); Jim
Bobo, Recent Decisions, Cities May Restrict Location of Adult Theatres Through Nar-
rowly Tailored, Content-Neutral, Time, Place and Manner Restriction, 56 MIss. L. J.
401 (1986).
203. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44. The City of Renton ordinance defined an adult movie
theater as "'[a]n enclosed building used for presenting motion picture films, video cas-
settes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or characteri[zed]
by an emphasis on [sexually oriented material]."' Id. (citing RENTON, WASHINGTON
RESOLUTION No. 2368 (1980)).
204. Id. at 46.
205. Id. at 47. For an in-depth discussion of the Renton Court's content distinction,
see Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1904 (1989).
206. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
207. Id.
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of communication." 208 Although the respondents contended that al-
most all available land for operating adult establishments was either
inappropriate for such a use or was not for sale, the Court asserted
that the First Amendment did not demand that the government pro-
vide ideal locales for speech-oriented businesses.2 9
5. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas
In 1990, in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,210 the Supreme Court
once again addressed the issue of the regulation of sexually oriented
businesses. 211 In FW/PBS, three groups brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of an ordinance passed by the Dallas city council.212
The ordinance, which regulated sexually oriented businesses2l3
through a zoning and licensing scheme, was focused at reducing the
secondary effects of urban blight and criminal activity. 214 In a plural-
ity opinion, the Court held that the licensing requirements were an
unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of speech because they
failed to establish procedural safeguards first annunciated by the
208. Id. The district court found 520 acres of land suitable for the respondents to
purchase. Id. at 53-54.
209. Id. at 54 (emphasis added). "That respondents must fend for themselves in the
real estate market, on equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees,
does not give rise to a First Amendment violation." Id. For a discussion of the inter-
relationship between Young, Schad, and Renton, see Leon Harvey Lee, Jr., Note, Con-
stitutional Law-Policing the Parlor and the First Amendment-City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 673 (1987).
210. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
211. Id.
212. DALLAS Crry CODE ch. 41A (1986).
213. The ordinance defined sexually oriented business as: "[An adult arcade, adult
bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater,
adult theatre, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter center." Id. at ch.
41A, § 41A-2(19).
214. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 220. Section 41A-1(a) states:
It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate sexually oriented businesses to
promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the citizens of the
city, and to establish reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the con-
tinued concentration of sexually oriented businesses within the city. The pro-
visions of this chapter have neither the purpose nor effect of imposing a
limitation or restriction on the content of any communicative materials, in-
cluding sexually oriented materials. Similarly, it is not the intent nor effect of
this chapter to restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented materials
protected by the First Amendment, or to deny access by the distributors and
exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to their intended market.
DALLAS CITY CODE ch. 41A, § 41A-l(a) (1986). Regardless of this "intent disclaimer,"
and comparable remarks by both city councilmembers and city commissioners who en-
acted the ordinance, public supporters endorsed the restriction because of its suppres-
sive effects on speech. See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-65 n.11
(N.D. Tex. 1986).
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Court in Freedman v. Maryland.215
The Freedman case involved a local censorship board which was
authorized to revoke a book or motion picture distributor's license
for the sale or display of obscene materials. The Court held that in
order for such an entity to pass constitutional muster, its method of
review must meet three requirements. 216 First, the censorship board
must place the burden of proof on the restraining party.21 7 Second,
the board must make prompt judicial review available to the cen-
sored party.218 Third, the board must aim any restraint imposed
before a final judicial determination at preserving the status quo un-
til the matter can be resolved in court.219
In its endorsement of the Freedman factors, the Court in FWIPBS
emphasized that while "prior restraints are not unconstitutional per
se . .. [a]ny system of prior restraint comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."220 This omi-
nous statement signaled that in the 1990s, issues of prior restraint
would likely face exacting scrutiny by the Court.
D. Procedural Challenges to Nude Dancing Regulations
When the government attempts to restrict a constitutional free-
dom, a party can challenge the restriction through the court system.
This section discusses the various methods for challenging ordinances
that impose unconstitutional restrictions upon freedom of expression.
1. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
One procedural challenge to a municipal ordinance is the claim
that the law is inherently vague.22 ' "Void for vagueness" simply
means that a court cannot impose criminal punishment where a rea-
sonable person could not have realized his or her conduct was forbid-
215. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
216. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 558 (1975)). For a further discussion of FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, see
Grace F. Woods, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Procedural Safeguards Required
in First Amendment Prior Restraint Context, 42 FLA. L. REV. 399 (1990).
221. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (ruling that municipal-
ity's anti-noise ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 550-52 (1965) (holding that breach of peace ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague because the ordinance allowed individuals to be reprimanded for merely expres-
sing unpopular opinions). For further discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine, see
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-85 (1960); Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An
Inquiry into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 1543, 1548-59 (1981) (discussing traditional pur-
poses of vagueness challenges).
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den.222 The Court generally evaluates vagueness challenges using
three standards. 223 First, the law must "give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly."224 Second, the ordinance must present
clear, straightforward guidelines for its application.225 Third, the law
must not threaten the exercise of valid First Amendment rights.226
There are several policy reasons underlying the concern about
vague statutes. First, vague statutes may be ambiguous, whereas
clearly defined statutes enable state officials to use objective stan-
dards while evaluating the speech in question.2 27 Second, the en-
forcement of vague statutes may have a "chilling effect" on protected
speech-the thought being that persons will shy away from any re-
lated activity in order to avoid potential litigation.228 Third, there
must be clear guidelines for law enforcement officials to regulate
speech-related activity. This policy is particularly applicable when
analyzing the guidelines for speech-related arrests. It is important
that an ordinance not allow officers to arrest someone solely on the
grounds that they disagree with the message the arrestee is attempt-
ing to convey.
For example, in Kolender v. Lawson,229 the Court invalidated a
222. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 753-58 (1974) (holding that Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, which permitted court martial for "behavior unbecoming of an officer and
a gentleman," was not unconstitutionally vague).
It is important to note that the void for vagueness doctrine differs from the over-
breadth doctrine in that a plaintiff must show that an ordinance is vague as applied to
him. Whereas, a plaintiff who asserts a challenge on the ground of overbreadth need
not demonstrate whether or not the statute actually hinders his personal activity. See
infra notes 231-45 and accompanying text.
223. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. The strictness of the three standards depends upon
the degree of vagueness ascribed to the questioned legislation. For instance, the Court
usually subjects economic regulation to a less stringent analysis, while it subjects legis-
lation which embraces constitutional rights to stricter analysis.
224. Id,
225. 1d at 108-09; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (finding that statutes, which fail to provide explicit means
for those who enforce the law, violate due process rights).
226. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (stating that void for vagueness
doctrine requires a stricter degree of specificity when the ordinance touches First
Amendment expression); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576 (1974) (finding
that a more strict vagueness doctrine should apply when the law interferes with free-
dom of expression claims).
227. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (stating that "vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning").
228. Id. at 109 ("[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' ") (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). For further
discussion of the "chilling effect," see infra notes 385-412 and accompanying text.
229. 461 U.S. 352 (1973).
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state statute which required persons who loitered on streets to pro-
vide "credible and reliable" identification and to account for their
presence when a police officer asked them.230 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the most significant aspect of
the vagueness doctrine is the implementation of guidelines that pro-
hibited arbitrary, selective enforcement on a constitutionally suspect
basis by police officers.23 1 However, even under a strict interpreta-
tion of ordinance regulating free expression, "void for vagueness"
challenges to laws restricting nudity are difficult to sustain.23 2
2. Overbreadth Doctrine
Individuals often challenge city ordinances as being overly
broad.233 Parties attacking laws which restrict nude dancing fre-
quently plead the overbreadth doctrine as the basis for their com-
plaints.2 34 According to this doctrine, courts should not permit the
government to encroach upon First Amendment guarantees any fur-
ther than is necessary to protect a compelling state interest.23 5 Gen-
erally, an individual may not assert the overbreadth doctrine as a
challenge to an otherwise valid statute. However, the doctrine cre-
ates an exception for situations involving protected expression.236
230. Id.
231. Id. at 358.
232. See, e.g., South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 (11th
Cir. 1984) (finding that statute prohibiting nudity in a public place was not unconstitu-
tionally vague); Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(overruling challenge for vagueness of terms "adjacent waters," "nude," and "suitable
bathing dress"). But see Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In
Erzoznik, a city ordinance prohibited all nudity from being displayed on outdoor movie
theatre screens visible from a public place. The Court held that the law was vague
because it banned nudity in general and did not make exceptions for non-indecent
nudity. Id. at 213.
233. For an in-depth analysis of the overbreadth doctrine, see Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L. J. 853 (1991).
234. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 933 (1975) (defendant may
challenge a statute as overly broad "if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit pro-
tected speech or expression of other persons not before the Court"); Glen Theatre, Inc.
v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs challenge public nudity statute for
overbreadth); BSA, Inc., v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs chal-
lenged public nudity statute for overbreadth); Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
1981) (statute held overbroad); Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1975)
(finding that ordinance banning topless dancing within municipality was invalid for
First Amendment overbreadth).
235. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10-14
(1981). See also TRIBE, supra note 49 at § 12-24, 710-12. The Supreme Court has stated
that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288, 307 (1964).
236. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 611-12 (1973). The Broadrick Court stated:
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The Court has justified this deviation as a "judicial prediction or as-
sumption that the statutes' very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression."237 The rationale behind the overbreadth doctrine is not
to protect an out-of-court individual's expression, but rather to re-
duce the consequences that overly expansive legislation have on First
Amendment freedom of expression.2 38
For instance, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,239 the City of North
Hempstead, New York passed an ordinance which prohibited any fe-
male from revealing her breasts in public. 240 Establishments which
featured topless dancing challenged the ordinance's constitutional-
ity.24 1 Although the Court upheld the ordinance as far as it applied
to the establishments which served alcohol,242 it nevertheless permit-
ted them to challenge the ordinance on the basis of overbreadth. 243
However, the Court ultimately upheld the injunction without reach-
ing the merits of the case.24 4
Even in the wake of the dubious Doran decision, courts have dis-
tinguished between ordinances which regulate conduct and those
which regulate "pure speech." 245 However, because the overbreadth
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space
and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legis-
lative judgement that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other
compelling needs of society.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12.
However, one must also note that even plaintiffs accused of unprotected expression
can challenge state laws which are overly broad.
237. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
238. See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (quoting
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612); see also Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620, 634 (1980) (overly broad statutes may deter expression because third parties fear-
ing criminal sanctions may not come forward to exercise their right of expression);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (finding that possibility that the govern-
ment may mute protected speech outweighs the harm in permitting protected speech
to go unpunished).
239. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
240. Id. at 933.
241. Id. at 924.
242. Id. at 932-33. The Court emphasized that because the establishments served al-
cohol, the Twenty-first Amendment authority outweighed any First Amendment in-
terest in nude dancing. Id. at 932 (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972)).
243. 1d at 933.
244. 1& at 934.
245. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
However, Justice Brennan has expressed disagreement with this distinction. In his
dissenting opinion in Broadrick, he stated:
[T]he Court offers no rationale to explain its conclusion that, for purposes of
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doctrine has powerful ramifications, the United States Supreme
Court has been careful to use the doctrine conservatively.246 Conse-
quently, when a statute is challenged, the asserted overbreadth must
be significant in order for the Court to strike down the legislation.247
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual History
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, two South Bend, Indiana adult estab-
lishments, the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theatre, desired to of-
fer totally nude dancing as entertainment for their patrons.2 48 The
Kitty Kat Lounge sold alcoholic beverages and offered nude "go-go"
dancing.249 The Chippewa Bookstore, run by Glen Theatre, offered
booths with glass panels through which paying customers could view
live women dancing nude on a platform. 250 The performances at the
Chippewa Bookstore and the Kitty Kat Lounge, generally called
"striptease acts," were similar.251 Each began with a fully clothed fe-
male who danced to one or more songs while taking off her cloth-
ing.2 5 2 At the conclusion of the dance, the performer was either
totally nude or nearly nude.2 53 However, an Indiana statute regulat-
ing "public nudity" prohibited such activity.254 The statute required
the dancers to wear "pasties" and "G-strings" when they per-
overbreadth analysis, deterrence of conduct should be viewed differently from
deterrence of speech, even where both are equally protected by the First
Amendment. Indeed, in the case before us it is hard to know whether the
protected activity falling within the Act should be considered speech or
conduct.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770.
See generally David S. Bogan, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV.
679, 712-14 (1978).
246. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.
247. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985) (finding that party
may challenge statute on basis of overbreadth only if the overbreadth is substantial);
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984) (citations
omitted) (stating that for a party to challenge a statute as overly broad, "there must be
a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court...").
248. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2458-59 (1991).
249. Id, at 2458.
250. Id.
251. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 416 (N.D. Ind.
1988).
252. Id.
253. Id. One performer, Darlene Miller, danced to the Bon Jovi song, "You Give
Love a Bad Name." She began her routine with hip-shaking struts up and down the
stage. After removing her dress and bikini underwear, Miller was left wearing only
her spike-heels and a tattoo above her right bosom. Linda P. Campbell & William
Grady, Indiana Striptease Case Pits Public Morals, 1st Amendment, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
26, 1991, at C8.
254. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988) provides:
Public Indecency
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formed.255 Furthermore, the establishments did not pay the dancers
on an hourly basis; the dancers performed solely on commission. 256
The respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana stat-
ute, asserting that the law's prohibition against complete nudity
while dancing violated the First Amendment's right to free
expression.257
Section 1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public inde-
cency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple,
or the showing or the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Id. The State acknowledged that the dancing at issue was not obscene. Thus, obscen-
ity was not an issue which the Court addressed. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d at 1082. Also, the plaintiffs recognized that the establishments in question were
"public places" under the statute. Id.
255. See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). Approximately 24 other states have similar
laws in effect. Linda Greenhouse, States May Ban Nude Dancing to Protect "Order,"
Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1991, § 1, at 1.
256. The performers were entitled to 100 percent of the bar's earnings obtained
from the first $60.00 in beverage sales. During oral argument, the state's attorney,
Wayne Uhl, asserted that since the dancers desired to perform nude to make more
money, their dancing was similar to "commercial speech." Accordingly, it deserved
less protection. One justice replied, "That's why Dickens wrote his books, too." After
Uhl suggested Dickens had aspirations in mind other than earning profits, the Justice
replied, "Are you sure of that?" Supreme Court Hears Free Speech Arguments on
Nude Dancing-First Amendment" Barnes v. Glen Theatre, ENT. LITIG. REP., Mar. 11,
1991. However, it must be noted that the fact that the dancers earned a profit by ex-
posing their nude bodies is immaterial for constitutional protection. See Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
257. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459. In 1985, Glen Theatre scheduled Gayle Ann Marie
Sutro, an accomplished actress, stunt performer, and ecdysiast, to dance at the Chip-
pewa Bookstore. During Sutro's engagement at the bookstore, the Chippewa drive-in
featured a movie in which the dancer had a starring role.
Sutro had extensive training and experience in the field of entertainment. She stud-
ied acting, dancing, speech and language for more than 15 years, and her job history
indicated that she had danced, acted and modeled professionally. Sutro was also a
member in good standing of the Screen Actors Guild, the Screen Extras Guild, and
AFTRA. In her statement, Sutro said when she danced she tried to "communicate as
well as entertain." Further, she choreographed her nude dancing with the intent to
properly express this emotion. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F.
Supp. 414, 420 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
Sandy Diamond, another dancer who performed at Ramona's Car Wash, spent four
years at the Academy of Ballet and had seven years' experience as an "exotic dancer."
Id. at 421. In addition, Diamond was also an accomplished movie and television actress,
and designed her own costumes for her dance performances. Id.
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B. Procedural Facts
Litigation began in 1985 with three separate actions filed in federal
court.258 The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding
the ordinance unconstitutional for overbreadth.259 The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision because the Supreme
Court's dismissal of appeals from State v. Baysinger26O invalidated
the trial court's decision.261 The Seventh Circuit then remanded the
case to the district court for arguments regarding the plaintiffs' asser-
tion that the statute violated their right to free expression.2 62
On remand, the district court found that "the type of dancing these
plaintiffs wish to perform is not expressive activity protected by the
Constitution of the United States."263 On a second appeal, the Sev-
258. The three cases were Miller v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, Glen The-
atre Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, and Diamond v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage
Comm'n. The disputes were filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (original action to re-
dress deprivation of civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (declaratory judgment) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (civil rights). Brief for Petitioner at 26, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991) (No. 90-26).
For further discussion of the comparison of content-based and content-neutral regu-
lation emphasizing the distinctions between various incidental regulation standards,
see David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 491
(1988).
259. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459. See also supra notes 233-47 and accompanying text.
260. 397 N.E.2d 580, 597 (Ind. 1979), appeals dismissed sub nom., Clark v. Indiana,
446 U.S. 931, and Dove v. Indiana, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
261. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459. Justice Rehnquist explained the Indiana Supreme
Court's treatment of the overbreadth issue as follows:
The Indiana Supreme Court appeared to give the public indecency statute a
limiting construction to save it from a facial overbreadth attack: 'There is no
right to appear nude in public. Rather, it may be constitutionally required to
tolerate or allow some nudity as a part of some larger form of expression mer-
iting protection, when the communication of ideas is involved.'
Five years after Baysinger, however, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a
decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals holding that the statute did 'not ap-
ply to activity such as the theatrical appearances involved herein, which may
not be prohibited absent a finding of obscenity,' in a case involving a partially
nude dance in the 'Miss Erotica of Fort Wayne' contest. The Indiana Supreme
Court did not discuss the constitutional issues beyond a cursory comment that
the statute had been upheld against constitutional attack in Baysinger, and
Erhardt's conduct fell within the statutory prohibition .... Therefore, the
Indiana Supreme Court did not affirmatively limit the reach of the statute in
Baysinger, but merely said that to the extent the First Amendment would re-
quire it, the statute might be unconstitutional as applied to some activities.
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459 n.1 (citations omitted).
262. Id (citing Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 288-90 (1986)). The dis-
trict court was specifically directed to "examine the plaintiffs' proferred evidence of
the dancing they wish to perform [and decide if] the activity should be afforded First
Amendment protection." Pearson, 802 F.2d at 291.
263. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459. The district court concluded that the dances were
"mere conduct" and described them as "striptease dances . . . not performed in any
theatrical or dramatic context .... Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend,
695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
The district court initially declared the Glen Theatre, Inc. plaintiffs' claims moot be-
cause a fire had destroyed their building. Glen Theatre, Inc., 695 F. Supp. at 416. How-
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enth Circuit reversed, holding that all nonobscene nude dancing per-
formed for entertainment is "expressive activity" protected by the
First Amendinent.26 4
The state defendants26 5 then requested a rehearing en banc.2 m
The Seventh Circuit granted the rehearing.267 On May 24, 1990, the
court of appeals vacated and reversed the trial court's judgment,
prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the Indiana public inde-
cency statute.268 The Seventh Circuit further concluded that the
statute was invalid because "its purpose was to prevent the message
of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers." 269 The Supreme
ever, pursuant to a post-judgment motion, the district court found the case was not
moot, thereby making the judgment binding on all parties. Id.
264. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459-60 (citing Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d
826, 827 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2465 (1991)). For a discussion criticizing Judge
Posner's-concurring opinion in the Miller decision, see R. George Wright, Judge Rich-
ard Posner on the. Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 21 CuMB. L. REV. 225 (1991).
265. The defendants in the Seventh Circuit were: the Civil City of South Bend;
Michael P. Barnes, Prosecuting Attorney for St. Joseph County, Indiana; Linley E.
Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana and the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commis-
sion; Charles Huiley, Chief of Police of South Bend Police Department. Brief for Peti-
tioners at 19, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26).
266. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
267. Brief for Petitioner at 20, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
(No. 90-26).
268. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460; Brief for Petitioners at 20, Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26). The Seventh Circuit ruled that "as a matter of
law, non-obscene nude dancing performed as entertainment is expression and such is
entitled to limited protection under the First Amendment." Miller v. Civil City of
South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2465 (1991). In a
lengthy and eloquent concurrence, Judge Posner voiced his opinion that the nudity in
the dance was not conduct but true expression:
[T]he dancing and the music are not distractions from the main theme,
patched on to fool the censor; they are what make a given female body ex-
pressive of a specifically sexual emotion. The striptease is the ensemble of the
music, the dance, the disrobing, and the nude end state; it is more erotic than
any of the components; and what makes it more erotic than the body itself or
the disrobing itself, is, precisely, that it is expressive of erotic emotion.
Miller, 904 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., concurring).
269. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460. The majority stated that the statute was an invalid
restriction on nude dancing, regardless of the state's "laudable concerns" of protecting
public morality in general and specifically, the family structure. Miller, 904 F.2d at
1088. The court reasoned that "it]he messages conveyed by the performances in ques-
tion, no matter how unappealing to one's personal value system, are protected none-
theless." Ld. The court of appeals also referred to the Second Circuit, which stated:
While the entertainment afforded by the nude ballet at Lincoln Center to
those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by the
judges) or in quality (as viewed by the critics), it may not differ in substance
from the dance viewed by the person [at the local pub].
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d at 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2465 (1991) (quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974),
1371
Court of the United States granted certiorari.2 70
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BARNES OPINION
A. Justice Rehnquist's Plurality Opinion
In a closely divided decision,271 a majority of the Court held that
requiring the performers to wear pasties and G-strings while dancing
does not violate an individual's First Amendment right to free ex-
pression.2 72 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, first ad-
dressed the issue of whether nude dancing was conduct or protected
expression. 273 Holding that nude dancing was a form of expression,
although "only marginally SO,"274 the Chief Justice noted that the In-
diana public indecency statute was valid regardless of its "incidental
limitations on some expressive activity." 275 In reaching its decision,
the majority relied upon the standard set forth in United States v.
O'Brien,276 where the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether
aff'd in part, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)). Judge Flaum, writing for
the majority, stated:
Though this dance is clearly of inferior artistic and aesthetic quality as con-
trasted with a classic ballet such as the Dance of the Seven Veils in Strauss'
Salome, the erotic message communicated to the viewers is present in both
performances. That Strauss' Salome tells a compelling story and the nude
dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge may not [sic] is not determinative; expres-
sion does not lose its protection for lack of a scripted plot.
Miller, 904 F.2d at 1087.
270. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460. In support of Barnes, the following organizations
submitted amicus curiae briefs: National Governors Association, National Association
of Counties, United States Counsel of Mayors, International City Management Associ-
ation, National League of Cities, American Family Association, National Family Legal
Foundation, Children's Legal Foundation, and the States of Arizona, Connecticut, Mis-
souri, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. Bernard James, Nude Dancing: Conduct or
Expression?, 1990-91 S. CT. PREVIEW 149, Jan. 25, 1991.
Several of the briefs stressed the need to preserve "society's moral structure and de-
cency" and the "paramount interest in preventing the sexual exploitation and degrada-
tion of women." Ruth Marcus, Justices Accept Cases on Nude Dancing,
Discrimination, Libel as Term Opens, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1990 § 1, at A4.
In support of Glen Theatre, the Georgia On-Premise & Lounge Association argued
that nude dancing should be protected because it was expressive entertainment. Also,
they asserted that because the state wished to ban nude dancing in all situations, the
restriction was not reasonable or incidental. Bernard James, Nude Dancing: Conduct
or Expression?, 1990-91 S. CT. PREVIEW 149, Jan. 25, 1991.
271. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion in which only Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Justices Scalia and Suter filed concurring opinions,
and Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
and Stevens joined. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1991).
272. Id. at 2460.
273. Id.
274. Id. Justice Rehnquist also referred to the nude dancing as "expressive con-
duct." Id.
275. Id. at 2461.
276. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For further discussion of the O'Brien test, see Lawrence
R. Velvel, Freedom of Speech and the Draft Card Burning Case, 16 KAN. L. REV. 149
(1967); Andrew E. Forshey, Note, The First Amendment Becomes a Nuisance: Arcara
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the government possesses a valid justification for regulating
speech.277
In O'Brien, the defendant and several of his colleagues ceremoni-
ally burned their draft cards on the steps of a Boston municipal
building to protest the Vietnam War.278 The government convicted
O'Brien of disobeying the 1965 amendment to the Selective Service
Act, which forbids one from "willfully and knowingly" destroying a
draft card.279 The First Circuit held that the statute violated
O'Brien's freedom of speech.28 0 However, the Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that when an activity involves both speech and non-
speech elements, the government can justify a First Amendment
limitation by a "sufficiently important government interest."28 1 Ac-
cording to O'Brien, in order to justify government regulation of
speech, the state must meet each part of the following four-part test:
(1) enacting the ordinance or statute must be "within the constitu-
tional power of the government"; (2) the ordinance must "further an
important or substantial government interest"; (3) the governmental
interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression";
and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."28 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist found the Indiana statute explicitly within
the state's constitutional power, thereby satisfying O'Brien's first
prong.28 3 However, the Chief Justice found it difficult to determine
whether the statute passed the second prong of the O'Brien test, fur-
thering a substantial government interest, for several reasons. First,
because Indiana's legislative history was not recorded when the stat-
ute was enacted, the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute was
v. Cloud Books, Inc., 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1987). Commentators have criticized the
O'Brien decision for its failure to judge O'Brien's actions using a more traditional First
Amendment weighing of speech and nonspeech concerns. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Free
Speech and Symbolic Conduct The Drqft Card Burning Case, 1 Sup. CT. REV. 10-11
(1968).
277. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
278. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70.
279. Id. at 370. Under the act an offense was committed by one "who forges, alters,
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certifi-
cate." 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 462(b)(3) (West 1990).
280. O'Brien, :391 U.S. at 371. See also O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d at 538, 541-
42 (1st Cir. 1967).
281. O'Brien, :391 U.S. at 376-77.
282. Id. at 377. This analysis is the time, place, and manner test discussed supra at
notes 74-95, 135-42 and accompanying text.
283. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
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unclear.284 Second, in discussing the statute, the Indiana Supreme
Court neither recognized this problem nor clarified the statute's pur-
pose.28 5 Thus, the Chief Justice questioned the type of governmental
interest the state legislature intended to further when it enacted the
statute.286 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked to the com-
mon law for guidance.28 7 He pointed out that at common law, courts
considered public nudity malum in se288 and "gross."28 9 These char-
acterizations, therefore, demonstrated a significant government inter-
est in curbing public nudity.2 90 He also reiterated that the statute
was a "general prohibition" of all nudity which took place before bar-
room dancing began.2 9 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Indi-
284. IM
285. Id.
286. 1d In fact, when the court questioned the state's lawyer as to the statute's
purpose, he first responded that the law intended to protect marriage. Upon remem-
bering the skyrocketing divorce rate in the United States "he quickly added that that
battle had already been lost and he switched his ground to the prevention of adultery."
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2465 (1991) (Posner, J., concurring).
287. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
288. Black's Law Dictionary defines malum in se as follows:
A wrong in itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of
the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public law. An act is
said to be malum in se when it is inherently and essentially evil, that is im-
moral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without any regard to
the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the state.
BLACK's LAw DIcIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
289. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948))
(stating that "[a]cts of gross... indecency or obscenity, injurious to public morals [vio-
late] the public policy that requires ... retribution for acts that flaunt accepted stan-
dards of conduct"). However, in 1948, the year Winters was decided, "accepted
standards of conduct" were considerably more conservative than in 1991, when the
Court decided Barnes.
290. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
291. Id. In 1831, an Indiana statute punished "open notorious lewdness, or... any
grossly scandalous and public indecency." Id. (quoting REv. LAwS OF IND., ch. 26, § 60
(1831)). However, today one could challenge this statute on the grounds that it is void
for vagueness and is overbroad. For further discussion of these doctrines, see supra
notes 221-47 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the dissent proposed that Justice Rehnquist's classification of the stat-
ute as a "general prohibition" proved that it was not narrowly tailored and therefore
failed O'Brien's fourth prong. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473, 2475 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
Justice Rehnquist also cited two cases in which the Court previously upheld legisla-
tion on moral grounds: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Id at 2462. Neither of the two cases cited by Justice
Rehnquist involved the use of legislation to restrict speech. Thus, Rehnquist's exten-
sion of "morality" as a basis for upholding legislation which affects free speech is ar-
guably a creation of new law.
In Bowers, the Court did not accept the respondent's argument that the government
should legalize homosexual sodomy in the home. Id at 195. In that case, the respon-
dent relied upon Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), where the Court stated, "If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."
Id. at 595. However, the Bowers Court relied upon the "morality" argument referred
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ana's "interest in protecting order and morality" was a substantial
governmental interest. Thus, the statute satisfied the second prong
of the O'Brien test.292
Next, the Chief Justice analyzed whether the Indiana statute satis-
fied O'Brien's third prong:293 the state's interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech.2 94 The plurality contended that disallow-
ing a performer to be completely nude while dancing does not indi-
cate that the restriction relates to what the nudity is meant to
express.295 The plurality denied that Indiana's prohibition of total
nudity was intended to suppress the dancer's erotic message.29 In
fact, Rehnquist asserted that the nudity alone was the "evil the state
seeks to prevent," regardless of whether it was combined with ex-
pressive conduct such as dancing.29 7
The Chief Justice analogized the instant case to the facts in
O'Brien, where the Court addressed the destruction of draft cards. In
that case, the Court upheld the petitioner's conviction for burning his
card because of the compelling state interest in the preservation of
to by Justice Rehnquist and distinguished Stanley because, just as in Barnes, "the deci-
sion was firmly grounded in the First Amendment." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. For fur-
ther discussion of legislative interaction with individual freedom, see Paul L. Alpern,
Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick- The Uneasy Interaction Between Legislative Interac-
tion and Judicial Restraint, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 213 (1987).
292. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462. However, as one commentator remarked: 'The
question is not whether the enforcement of morals is legitimate, but whether it is per-
missible for the state to enforce moral beliefs in a manner that is inconsistent with the
Constitution." Simon Roberts, The Obscenity Exception. Abusing the First Amend-
ment, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 677, 701 (1989).
293. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
294. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967).
295. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462-63. The Court pointed out that one could consider
numerous actions "expressive." Id. at 2462. However, the Court cited O'Brien, which
rejected this extended concept of "expressive conduct." Id The O'Brin Court stated:
"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be la-
belled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to ex-
press an idea." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
296. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463. The Court stated, "The requirement that the danc-
ers don pasties and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it
conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic." Id. However, Justice
Rehnquist should have given credence to Justice Holmes' opinion in Bleistein v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Justice Holmes wrote:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only [in] law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of worth of [art] .... At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their [artist] spoke.
Id. at 251.
297. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
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valid draft card information.298 Hence, the government punished
O'Brien not for the communicative aspect of his conduct-the polit-
ical statement he was making-but for the non-communicative aspect
of his action: the destruction of the draft card.299 Similarly, the ma-
jority reasoned that even though the dancing in Barnes possessed
communicative elements, the dancing itself was not why the state
disallowed the activity. Rather, the ordinance sought to eliminate
the dancing merely because it involved nudity.300 Thus, O'Brien's
third prong was satisfied.3 01
Finally, the Court turned to the fourth prong of O'Brien to deter-
mine whether the First Amendment restriction was the least restric-
tive means available while still furthering the state interest.302 The
Court determined that, because the Indiana statute was "narrowly
tailored," the restriction was the least possible intrusion on free
speech.3 03 The majority concluded that demanding that the dancers
"wear at least pasties and a G-string is modest, and the bare mini-
mum necessary to achieve that purpose."w0 4 In reaching its decision,
the Court found that the government interest served by the statute
was consistent with "societal disapproval of nudity in public places
and among strangers."305 Accordingly, the public indecency statute
satisfied O'Brien's fourth prong.306
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia determined that the Courts
should uphold the Indiana Public Indecency Statute, but not because
it satisfied the standard set forth in O'Brien. Rather, he believed
that the statute did not implicate the First Amendment whatso-
ever. 307 First, Justice Scalia argued that the state did not attempt to
298. Id
299. Id Because O'Brien frustrated the state's purpose when he destroyed his card,
he was punished and "for this non-communicative aspect of his conduct, and for noth-
ing else, he was convicted." Md (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382).
300. Id.
301. IL Although the majority reached this conclusion, the dissent strongly dis-
agreed. See id at 2474-75 (White, J., dissenting).
302. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
303. Id
304. Id.
305. AL However, the majority failed to address the distinction that the public
place in Barnes was an indoor adults-only club frequented by consenting patrons,
while the statute's purpose could actually have been to prevent nonconsenting persons
in open areas, such as beaches, from being forced to view another's nude body. None-
theless, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion addresses this argument. See id& at 2465.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
306. Id.
307. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia felt that the statute was not aimed
at expression, but governed the mere conduct of appearing nude in public, and thus
was not even subject to First Amendment protection. I& at 2463-64 (Scalia, J., concur-
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control expressive behavior through the public indecency statute, but
merely sought to regulate a form of conduct.308 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that because Indiana's first public nudity statute,30 9 enacted in
1831, was in place long before the establishment of barroom nude
dancing, the state could not have directed the statute at such expres-
sive behavior.3 l 0 In support of this theory, he referred to a number
of instances in which the government used the statute to prosecute
nonexpressive activities.3 1 '
Justice Scalia also rebutted the dissent's argument that the stat-
ute's aim was to protect the nonconsenting public from being forced
to view another's nude body.312 He argued that the purpose of the
statute was to protect not only the nonconsenting public from nudity,
ring). Justice Scalia's conclusion worried numerous commentators and legal scholars
alike. See, e.g., Bernard James, Justices Still Seeking a Consistent Voice on First
Amendment, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S4. Professor Bernard James, Pepperdine
University School of Law, declared, "[To ignore the burden placed on protected
speech when there is no proof that a law was aimed at suppressing expression-is the
most disturbing element of the Court's new activism." Id. See also Linda Greenhouse,
States May Ban Nude Dancing to Protect "Order," Justices Rule, N. Y. TIMEs, Jun. 22,
1991, § 1, at 1 (stating that American Civil Liberties Union members were pleased that
the Court did not take Scalia's approach but drew a more narrow analysis).
308. Id. at 2464 (Scalia, J., concurring).
309. REV. LAWS OF IND. ch. 26, § 60 (1831).
310. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2464 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia pointed out that pub-
lic nudity was unlawful at common law. See 50 AM. JUR. 2D 449, § 17, 472-74 (1970); 93
A.L.R. 996, 997-98 (1934).
311. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). See Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ind. 1987)
(child molesting); In re Levinson, 444 N.E.2d 1175, 1176 (Ind. 1983) (public masturba-
tion); Preston v. State, 287 N.E.2d 347, 348 (1972) (same); Thomas v. State, 154 N.E.2d
503, 504-05 (Ind. 1958) (indecent exposure in public park); Blanton v. State, 533 N.E.2d
190, 191 (Ind. App. 1989) (prostitution). However, Sweeney v. State, 486 N.E.2d 651,
652 (Ind. App. 1985), cited by Justice Scalia, may actually undermine his argument.
The defendant in Sweeney, who performed sexual acts for a customer's viewing plea-
sure in an enclosed booth in an adult bookstore, was found not to have violated the
public indecency statute because the area was not considered a "public place" for pur-
poses of the statute. Sweeney, 486 N.E. 2d at 653.
Furthermore, using Justice Scalia's own argument that the statute has never been
used to regulate expression, should the Court ever find nude dancing to be expression,
the statute could not be used to regulate such expression. Therefore, given Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's conclusion that nude dancing was expressive activity at least "margin-
ally" deserving First Amendment protection, under Justice Scalia's analysis, nude
dancing should not be prohibited.
312. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia:
Perhaps the dissenters believe that "offense to others" ought to be the only
reason for restricting nudity in public places generally, but there is no basis
for thinking that our society has ever shared that Thoreauvian "you-may-do-
what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else" beau ideal-much
less for thinking that it was written into the Constitution.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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but the consenting public as well.3 13 Justice Scalia noted that Ameri-
can and other cultures have long forbidden some practices because
they are deemed "'contra bonos mores,' i.e., immoral." 314 Thus, he
supposed the statute's purpose was to impose the "traditional moral
view" that people should not publicly expose their sexual organs in-
discriminately, regardless of whether those present have consented to
view them.3 15
Second, Justice Scalia reasoned that this case did not even involve
the First Amendment because Indiana did not specifically aim its law
at suppressing expressive communication. 316 He pointed out that in
the past the Court has consistently held that any law which sup-
presses speech, even if the suppression is not related to the conduct,
must pass the First Amendment scrutiny.3 17 Justice Scalia criticized
this practice based upon his belief that "virtually any prohibited con-
duct can be performed for an expressive purpose-if only expressive
of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohibition."318 In addi-
tion, Justice Scalia distinguished the nude dancing in Barnes from ac-
tivities which are performed specifically for their expressive
characteristics. 19 Further, he questioned whether dancing, in gen-
eral, even fell into the category of inherently expressive behavior.320
313. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
314. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Examples of such activities include: cockfighting,
drug use, sadomasochism, prostitution, suicide, sodomy and bestiality. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
315. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia added, "The purpose of Indiana's
nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the
Hoosierdome to display their genitals to one another, even if there were not an of-
fended innocent in the crowd." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
316. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
317. Id. at 2465-66 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia provided examples such as Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) (noise reduction); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16
(1976) (election campaign regulation) and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)
(litter prevention). Id. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
318. Id. at 2466 (Scalia J., concurring). See, e.g., Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v.
Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (1984) (nude sunbathers' "message" that nudity was not
indecent).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(defacing flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(wearing black arm band); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (joining sit-in) and
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (flying red flag).
320. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 n.4. However, the dissent pointed out that the
dancing to which Scalia referred was "social dancing" present in a case which did not
even involve expressive behavior, but asserted that the plaintiff's "associational rights
were infringed upon by being forbidden admission to dance clubs because of age."
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
Further, the dissent did not agree with Justice Scalia's contention that dancing was
not inherently expressive behavior. Instead, they preferred the court of appeal's opin-
ion: "Dance has been defined as 'the art of moving the body in a rhythmical way, usu-
ally to music, to express an emotion or idea, to narrate a story, or simply to take
delight in the movement itself.'" Id at 2471 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v.
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Hence, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's inquiry should be
whether the purpose of the law is to inhibit expression.321 He as-
serted that laws affecting expressive conduct should receive the same
treatment as the Court adopted in Employment Division v. Smith,322
where the Court analyzed restrictions on the free exercise of reli-
gion.323 In Smith, the Court ruled that "general laws not specifically
targeted at religious practices did not require heightened First
Amendment scrutiny even though they diminish some people's abil-
ity to practice their religion."324 Similarly, argued Justice Scalia, the
Court should examine under First Amendment analysis only those
restrictions on conduct which the government directly targets at pro-
tected expression. 325 Otherwise, no First Amendment analysis is
needed.326
Third, Justice Scalia refused to endorse the plurality's application
of the O'Brien test.327 He reasoned that the Court should avoid mak-
ing judicial assessments of the "importance" of government interests,
particularly those which judge the correctness of societal moral stan-
dards.328 Justice Scalia used the same case law as the plurality to
support his proposition; however, he reached a different conclusion
as to why the challenged activities were prohibited.329 Where the
majority concluded the state's interest in forbidding the activities was
"substantial" or "important," Justice Scalia found a rational basis
standard was all that was necessary. 330 In summary, Justice Scalia
Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (1990) (en bane) (quoting 16 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 935 (1989)).
321. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring).
322. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (finding that a state's prohibition of peyote use was consti-
tutional although it prevented some Native Americans from freely practicing their
religion).
323. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring).
324. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
325. Id. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring).
326. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia pointed out that this is the Court's standard
practice in free exercise cases. For example, in Employment Division, Oregon Dept of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court ruled that if a general law is
not specifically aimed at religion, a higher degree of First Amendment scrutiny is not
required. Id. Hence, Justice Scalia asserted there is greater reason to apply the
Court's analysis to free expression cases because "[r]elatively few can plausibly assert
that their illegal conduct is being engaged in for religious reasons; but almost anyone
can violate almost any law as a means of expression." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467
(Scalia, J., concurring).
327. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
328. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
329. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). The two cases were Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
330. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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declared that he would uphold the Indiana statute simply because
"moral opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for its prohibi-
tion."331 Therefore, he concluded that the court of appeals' judgment
should be reversed.332
C. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Souter agreed with the outcome of the plurality's
decision, he took a more liberal approach than both the plurality and
Justice Scalia. Justice Souter determined that expressive dancing is
entitled to limited First Amendment protection.333 Although Justice
Souter conceded that dancing is expressive behavior, he concluded
that "nudity per se" is not. Rather, it is merely a condition.334 Next,
Justice Souter determined that the four-prong O'Brien test is the
proper analysis by which to judge whether nude dancing deserves
First Amendment protection. 33 5 However, Justice Souter wrote sepa-
rately because he did not agree with the plurality's conclusion that
the statute satisfied O'Brien's second prong.336 In a highly structured
opinion, Justice Souter confronted each prong of the O'Brien test as
applied to the facts in Barnes.3 37 Justice Souter agreed that the stat-
ute satisfied O'Brien's first prong, because one may find the authority
to enact such public indecency laws within the legislature's constitu-
tional power.338 However, when analyzing the second prong, his rea-
soning differed from that of the plurality. Justice Souter determined
that the statute satisfied the O'Brien test because the state had a sub-
stantial interest in deterring secondary effects of nude dancing such
as prostitution, crime and other illegal sexual activities.33 9 Justice
Souter asserted that application of the O'Brien test was appropriate
even if the Indiana legislature did not enact the statute for these rea-
331. Id at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
332. Id, (Scalia, J., concurring).
333. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter declared that
"when nudity is combined with expressive activity, its stimulative and attractive value
certainly can enhance the force of expression, and a dancer's acts in going from
clothed to nude, as in a strip-tease, are integrated into the dance and its expressive
function." Id (Souter, J., concurring).
334. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The majority determined that the statute met the
second prong because the government had a substantial interest in controlling "order
and morality." See id at 2462.
335. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
336. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 2468-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
338. Id at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
339. Id (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter did not agree that the Court should
limit itself by recognizing the legislation's justification. Instead, he decided to give def-
erence to the petitioner's declaration that the law should be applied to nude dancing
because such activity "encourag[es] prostitution, increas[es] assaults, and attract[s]
other criminal activity." Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Peti-
tioner at 37, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26)).
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sons.340 Accordingly, Justice Souter reasoned that because the Court
had already established that a state may restrict adult entertainment
because of its secondary effects,341 the statute satisfied O'Brien's sec-
ond prong.342
Addressing the third prong of O'Brien, Justice Souter concluded
that the state interest, that is, the decrease in prostitution and crimi-
nal activity, was not related to the suppression of free expression.343
Justice Souter distinguished expression which may result in in-
creased criminal activity and in the concentration of crowds gathered
to see the nude dancing.34 4 He recognized that when a statute regu-
lates nude dancing because of its secondary effects, the restriction is
somewhat related to free expression.3 45 However, Justice Souter ar-
gued that the expressive aspect of the nudity was so far attenuated
340. Md at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated:
Our appropriate focus is not an empirical inquiry into the actual intent of the
enacting legislature, but rather the existence or not of a current governmental
interest in the service of which the challenged application of the statute may
be constitutional .... At least as to the regulation of expressive conduct, "[w]e
decline to void [a statute] essentially on the ground that it is unwise legisla-
tion which [the legislature] had the undoubted power to enact and which
could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a
'wiser speech about it.'"
Md (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968))
(citations and footnote omitted).
341. Justice Souter cited Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (up-
holding a zoning ordinance which was established to deter the adverse secondary ef-
fects associated with adult entertainment). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (legislature concluded that "a concentration of 'adult' movie
theatres causes the areas to deteriorate and become the focus of crime"); California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (criminal activity associated with adult entertainment).
342. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring).
However, Justice Souter conceded that the "secondary effects" rationale he used to
meet O'Brien's second prong would be unlikely to withstand a challenge by a theatri-
cal production or ballet company. Souter stated:
It is difficult to see, for example, how the enforcement of Indiana's statute
against nudity in a production of "Hair" or "Equus" somewhere other than an
"adult" theater would further the State's interest in avoiding harmful secon-
dary effects, in the absence of evidence that expressive nudity outside the con-
text of Renton-type adult entertainment was correlated with such secondary
effects.
Id. at 2470 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
343. 1& at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring).
344. 1L at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated:
To say that pernicious secondary effects are associated with nude dancing es-
tablishments is not necessarily to say that such effects result from the persua-
sive effect of the expression inherent in the nude dancing. It is to say, rather,
only that the effects are correlated with the existence of establishments offer-
ing such dancing, without deciding what the precise causes of the correlation
actually are.
345. Id at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring).
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from the increase in criminal activity that the causation chain was
broken.346 Thus, the government restriction passed O'Brien's third
prong.34 7
Finally, Justice Souter turned to O'Brien's fourth prong, which re-
quires the restriction to be no broader than necessary to further the
state interest.348 Justice Souter characterized the limitation on ex-
pression as minimal compared to the dancer's opportunity to use
other modes of expression to convey her sensual message.349 There-
fore, the ordinance satisfied the fourth prong of O'Brien.350
Based upon his application of the O'Brien test, Justice Souter con-
cluded that restriction on nude barroom dancing was indeed constitu-
tional.351 Accordingly, because a plurality of the Justices agreed that
the ordinance satisfied the four-prong O'Brien test, the Court con-
cluded that the restriction on nude dancing did not violate First
Amendment freedom of expression, and thereby reversed the court
of appeal's holding.352
D. Justice White's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice White followed the reasoning of both the
court of appeal's and prior Supreme Court decisions which have held
that "nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections
from official regulation."35 3 The dissent acknowledged dancing as
"an ancient art form [which] 'inherently embodies the expression and
346. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 2470-71 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter's argument appears to be
patterned after a proximate cause theory. For a further discussion of the proximate
cause theory, see HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, (2d. ed.
1985); Thomas A. Moore, Proximate Cause, 203 N.Y.L.J. 1, 3 (1990); David E. Seidelson,
Some Reflections on Proximate Cause, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 1-42 (1980). But see Kenneth
Vinson, Proximate Cause Should Be Barred From Wandering Outside Negligence Law,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 215, 215-55 (1985).
348. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2470-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
349. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). However, Justice Souter did admit that the por-
tion of the statute which required dancers to wear pasties and a G-string moderated
the expression. See id. at 2471 (Souter, J., concurring). Hence, it could be argued that
this limitation of expression is proof that a state of total nudity is in fact, part of the
dancer's erotic message and therefore, is deserving of First Amendment protection.
350. Id. at 2471 (Souter, J., concurring).
351. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter's perspective on the scope of the
First Amendment is considerably more confined than that of his predecessor, Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., who retired in 1990. Thus, the Court most likely would have
decided Barnes differently had Justice Brennan remained on the Court. Linda Green-
house, States May Ban Nude Dancing to Protect "Order," Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 22, 1991, § 1, at 1.
352. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 (Souter, J., concurring).
353. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 66 (1981)). See Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (nude barroom
dancing may deserve "the barest minimum of protected expression"); California v. La-
Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (nude barroom dancing may be entitled to First and Four-
teenth Amendment protection); Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th
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communication of ideas and emotions.' 354
Next, Justice White pointed to several flaws in the plurality's ap-
proach.355 First, Justice White contended that the Court had contra-
dicted itself. On the one hand, the Court argued that it was
impossible to determine precisely what Indiana had intended when it
enacted the statute. Yet, on the other hand, the Court still concluded
the statute's purpose clearly was to protect "societal order and moral-
ity."356 Second, Justice White criticized the majority's willingness to
uphold the statute as a "general prohibition" against individuals be-
ing seen nude in public locations.357 Third, the dissent disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the ban on nude dancing was "un-
related to free expression."358 And finally, Justice White took issue
with the majority's assertion that the legislature drafted the statute
narrowly. 359
Although the Court labeled the statute's prohibition as general, it
was clear to the dissent that this terminology was incorrect.36o Jus-
Cir. 1990) rev'd 111 S. Ct. 2465 (1991) (non-obscene nude barroom dancing is expressive
behavior worthy of First Amendment protection).
According to Justice White, "That the performances in the Kitty Kat Lounge may
not be high art, to say the least, and may not appeal to the Court, is hardly an excuse
for distorting and ignoring settled doctrine." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2474 (White, J.,
dissenting).
354. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Civil City of
South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2465 (1991)). Justice White
referred to quotations in the court of appeals' decision which described the art form of
dance: "Inherently, it is the communication of emotion or ideas. At the root of all 'the
varied manifestations of dancing... lies the common impulse to resort to movement to
externalize states which we cannot externalize by rational means. This is basic
dance."' Miller, 904 F.2d at 1085 (quoting JOHN S. MARTIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
DANCE (1939)). Further, the Court of Appeals contended that "[t]he raw communica-
tive power of dance was noted by the French poet Stephan Mallarm6 who declared
that the dancer 'writing with her body .. . suggests things which the written work
could express only in several paragraphs of dialogue or descriptive prose.'" Barnes,
111 S. Ct. at 2471.72 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller, 904 F.2d at 1085-86).
355. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
356. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See id. at 2461.
357. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The majority stated, "The history
of Indiana's public indecency statute shows that it predates barroom dancing and was
enacted as a general prohibition." Id. at 2461.
358. Id. (quoting Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462).
359. Id. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent noted the majority relied upon
cases which prohibited the challenged activity regardless of whether the activity was
done in public or in the privacy of one's own home. Id. (White, J., dissenting). For
example, in O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the government prohibited a
war protestor from destroying his draft card regardless of whether he destroyed it in
his home or on the courthouse steps. Additionally, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), the government prohibited sodomy no matter where the sodomy occurred.
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tice White argued that if this restriction against public nudity were
truly a general one, it would apply to all situations.3 6 ' Yet, as the pe-
titioners themselves pointed out, theater productions such as "Hair"
are protected under the statute.3 6 2 Further, an Indiana policeman's
affidavit plainly acknowledged that "[n]o arrests have ever been
made for nudity as part of a play or ballet."3 63 Hence, the dissent
concluded the statute was not at all a general prohibition, but one
which the state specifically aimed at nude barroom dancing.36 Jus-
tice White also believed that because the prohibition was not a gen-
eral one, the holding in O'Brien forced the Court to examine the
statute's purpose more closely.36 5
Further, the dissent took issue with the plurality's conclusion that
the prohibition was not related to the suppressed expression.366 As
Justice White pointed out, the plurality admitted that nude dancing
holds an "erotic message."367 Also, they acknowledged that the
message would be "muted" if the dancers wore pasties and G-
strings.368 Therefore, because the regulation would affect the dance's
message, Justice White concluded that the restriction must be related
to the expressive behavior.3 6 9
Additionally, the dissent was dissatisfied with Justice Souter's
logic. 370 Justice White reasoned that if the State's aim was to de-
crease the secondary effects of nude dancing, and the means of
Hence, these prohibitions were what may be termed "general," whereas in Barnes, the
statute did not prohibit the nude dancing generally (i.e., it did not illegalize dancing
nude in one's own private bedroom). Id. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
361. Id at 2472-73 (White, J., dissenting).
362. See Petitioners' Brief at 25, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
(No. 90-26).
363. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Petitioners' Brief at
25, 30-31, Barnes, (No. 90-26)).
364. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent further criticized
Justice Scalia because he characterized the Indiana prohibition as a general one. Id at
2473 (White, J., dissenting).
365. Id (White, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that "the state's general inter-
est in promoting societal order and morality is not sufficient justification for a statute
which concededly reaches a significant amount of protected expressive activity." Id
(White, J., dissenting).
366. Id (White, J., dissenting).
367. See i&L at 2463. The plurality stated, "[Tihe requirement that the dancers don
pasties and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it con-
veys." Id (emphasis added).
368. Id at 2474 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463). Despite
the Court's conclusion that requiring performers to cover their body parts with pasties
and G-strings did not eradicate the dance's erotic message, it admitted that the require-
ment made the message less graphic. Id Therefore, the state's interference changed
the erotic message the dance communicated.
369. Id at 2474 (White, J., dissenting). "The sight of a fully clothed, or even par-
tially clothed, dancer... will have a far different impact on a spectator than that of a
nude dancer, even if the same dance is performed. The nudity is itself.., expressive."
Id (White, J., dissenting).
370. Id (White, J., dissenting).
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achieving this end demanded "covering up" the nudity, then it fol-
lows that nudity's expressive value must have some relation to the
government's interest.371 If the nudity was not a form of expression,
then it would not have an effect on criminal activity. Accordingly,
the dissent determined that the prohibition would fail O'Brien's
third prong.
Next, Justice White criticized both the plurality and Justice Sou-
ter's conclusions that the statute was narrowly drawn.372 The dissent
suggested other alternative measures which the state could have im-
plemented to regulate the dancing without broadly censoring an en-
tire category of expressive behavior.373
Finally, the dissent focused upon specific defects in Justice Scalia's
reasoning.374 Justice White reiterated his disagreement with Justice
Scalia's claim that the statute's prohibition was general in nature.3 75
Further, the dissent asserted that Indiana's reason for the prohibition
was to prevent the customers of adult establishments from being ex-
posed to the expressive elements of dance.376 The dissent therefore
believed that Justice Scalia's observation was exactly on point:
"Where government prohibits conduct precisely because of its com-
371. 1& at 2473-74 (White, J., dissenting). "Since the State permits the dancers to
perform if they wear pasties and G-strings but forbids nude dancing, it is precisely be-
cause of the distinctive, expressive content of the nude dancing performances at issue
in this case that the State seeks to apply the statutory prohibition." I& at 2474 (White,
J., dissenting).
372. 1& at 2475 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White declared, "Banning an entire
category of expressive activity... does not satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of
strict First Amendment scrutiny." I& (White, J., dissenting). See also Frisby v. Shultz,
487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("[a] complete ban can be narrowly tailored. .. only if each
activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil").
373. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting). First, Justice White sug-
gested the state could place minimum distance requirements on the dancers' perform-
ances, or it could use other time, place, and manner restrictions. I (White, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 135-142 and accompanying text.
Moreover, Justice White suggested that the State may use its twenty-first amend-
ment power to regulate establishments which serve alcohol. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475
(White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 109-124 and accompanying text.
374. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting).
375. AL (White, J., -dissenting). Justice White employed Justice Scalia's amusing
hypothetical to clarify this point:
We agree with Justice Scalia that the Indiana statute would not permit 60,000
consenting Hoosiers to expose themselves to each other in the Hoosierdome.
No one can doubt, however, that those same 60,000 Hoosiers would be per-
fectly free to drive to their respective homes all across Indiana and, once
there, to parade around, cavort, and revel in the nude for hours in front of
relatives and friends.
I at 2475-76 (White J., dissenting). See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
376. AL at 2476 (White, J., dissenting).
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municative attributes, we hold the regulation unconstitutional." 77
Therefore, Justice White and three other Justices concluded that the
State's prohibition against complete nudity while dancing violates a
dancer's First Amendment right to free expression.3 78
V. IMPACT OF THE BARNES DECISION
A. Social Impact
1. Public Response
First Amendment issues profoundly impact Americans regardless
of one's personal stand on a particular issue. Thus, immediate public
response to the Barnes decision was strong, yet diverse. 379 Some
Americans have interpreted the Court's words as powerful and
frightening limitations on fundamental freedoms.380 Some even be-
lieve that Justice Rehnquist's opinion will lead to an infringement
upon such freedoms as the exercise of religion.3S1 Others, however,
have taken a more lighthearted approach to the decision, emphasiz-
377. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (defacing flag); and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black arm bands).
378. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2476 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens joined in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 2471.
379. Thomas L. Jipping, director of the Free Congress Foundation, said, "The First
Amendment is not an altar on which American families must sacrifice the traditional
values that made this country great .... [The decision] gives a green light for commu-
nities to aggressively enforce basic standards of decency." However, Stephen Shapiro
of the American Civil Liberties Union believes that Barnes is "a dangerous and dis-
turbing decision because it says free speech can be censored in the interest of public
morality .... They took on the issue of nude dancing but ended up writing an essay,
and a bad essay, on the First Amendment." David Savage, Ban on Nude Dancing
Backed by High Court, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 22, 1991, at Al.
380. The following appeared in the L.A. TIMES editorial column:
Two side-by-side reports on the front page (June 22) were frightening.
In 'Ban on Nude Dancing Backed by High Court,' David G. Savage reports
that 'Government has the authority to protect 'societal order and morality,' in-
cluding the power to forbid 'expressive activity' within the confines of a pri-
vate establishment, Chief Justice William Rehnquist said for the court.'
In 'Gorbachev Puts Down Threat by Hard-Liners,' Michael Parks reports
that in response to his efforts for radical political and economic reforms in the
Soviet Union, Gorbachev said, 'The people understand that now is the time for
concrete action, a time when delays will kill. Yet we have people who do not
like this .... At any forum, in the mass media, at the plenums of the (Com-
munist Party) Central Committee, beyond the scenes, they are working to im-
pose their opinions on us, to impose their visions, their policies.'
I'm confused. Which is the dictatorship and which is the democracy?
Norman N. Alperin, Rancho Palos Verdes
Norman N. Alperin, Supreme Court on Nude Dancing, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at B6.
One commentator referred to the decision as "heinous" and quipped, "Yet again, the
Supreme Court has decided to tell women what to do with their bodies." Alex Beam,
Goodbye Zone; TG.I. W., BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1991, at 69.
381. The following letter appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES editorial section:
When High Court Voices Moral Disapproval
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ing that the s;ubject matter should not be taken so seriously.382
Nonetheless, the immediate impact felt by hundreds of adult estab-
lishments throughout Indiana will be strong. They now must force
their dancers to modify their dress to cover bare breasts and genita-
lia. Further, s:ince virtually all states across the nation have public
indecency laws,383 the decision grants broad leeway to the state legis-
latures to restrain live nude dancing.3 84
To the Editor:
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in his opinion in Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre, which allows states to ban nude dancing, appeals to moral disapproval of
public nudity. But he fails to explain why public nudity might be deemed im-
moral or if there might be a morality that would permit nudity under certain
conditions.
Early Christian baptisms were performed in the nude. The Apostolic Tra-
dition' of St. Hippolytus, bishop of Rome (circa 215), called for all to be bap-
tized-from little children to grown men and women-to "put off their
clothes." Moreover, this rule ordered, "Let no one go down to the water hav-
ing any alien object with them"-which, I suppose, would preclude pasties and
G-strings, as well as earrings and the like.
We all know that early Christians used the Roman public baths, where both
men and women bathed communally in the nude (according to Irenaeus, Ter-
tullian and Eusebius).
Christian morality did not preclude nudity until some church fathers devel-
oped an anti-body philosophy (borrowed ultimately from Plato), which led St.
Jerome in the fifth century, for example, to consider it immoral for a Chris-
tian virgin to bathe in the nude-even if all alone.
Chief Justice Rhnquist writes that "Public nudity is the evil the state
seeks to prevent." There is no evidence that the early Christians considered
nudity in church rites or in the public baths to be either an evil or immoral.
Anyone who chooses to be guided by early Christian morality should be con-
cerned not merely about the infringement of free expression, but also the in-
fringement of freedom of religion.
Roy Bowen Ward
Professor of Religion, Miami University
Oxford, Ohio, June 24, 1991.
Roy Bowen Ward, When High Court Voices Moral Disapproval, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12,
1991, at A28.
382. Judge Posner thought the real reason for wishing to take nude dancing outside
the realm of First Amendment protection was the "feeling that the proposition, 'the
First Amendment forbids the State of Indiana to require striptease dancers to cover
their nipples,' is ridiculous." Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100
(7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2465 (1991) (Posner, J., concurring). See also Bare Any
Burden, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 29, 1991 at 22, where one commentator asks, "Does this
[restriction] erode liberty or resist its trivialization?" Id.; Bruce Fein, Naked Truths...
Welcome Message, WASH. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1991, at G1. "Mhe gales of lugubrious re-
sponses to Glen Theattre are much ado about nothing." Id.
383. Forty-seven states proscribe public nudity laws. Bruce Fein, supra note 382, at
G1.
384. James Vicini, Nude Dancers Must Wear Pasties, G-Strings, Supreme Court
Says, REUTERS, Jun. 21, 1991.
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2. Artistic Stagnation and the Chilling Effect
A chilling effect occurs when a protected activity is inhibited due
to a fear of its legal or nonlegal ramifications. Such an effect may oc-
cur when a law restricts perfectly legal activity as well as the
targeted illegal activity.38 5 Hence, an indirect form of censorship
takes place. The artistic community has already begun to witness
such a stagnation since the Court decided Barnes.3 86
Sexually oriented expression is generally negatively stereotyped.
Therefore, the Barnes decision will likely have several important
ramifications. First, painters who fear the negative stigma associated
with nudity might be reluctant to produce sexually suggestive paint-
ings.3 8 7 Second, sculptors whose work glorifies the human anatomy
may become reticent or feel the need to tone down their expression
for fear of public criticism.38 8 Third, medical doctors and psycholo-
gists who perform photographic studies of child development may
fear that their work will be classified as "child exploitation." 38 9
Fourth, and most importantly, the political "pro-censorship message"
could affect artists' pocketbooks. In the wake of the Barnes decision,
organizations such as the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA)
may be reluctant to allocate funds to museums or other federally
funded groups.3 90 These examples are evidence of the hysteria and
repression which now loom over expressive activity in the United
States.
The Barnes decision is not the only recent threat to artistic free ex-
pression. In 1989, NEA President John D. Frohnmayer shocked the
artistic community by withdrawing NEA sponsorship from "Artists
Space," a gallery where artists were to promote a show spotlighting
the AIDS crisis.391 In a decision which many considered a response
to Congress' recent efforts to restrict sexually explicit art,
385. See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (referring to
"the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted...").
386. Patti Hartigan, Mapplethorpe's 'Chilling Effect' A Year Later, Battle Goes On,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 1991, at 1 (National/Foreign). Several artists interviewed
attested that supporters withdrew their funding after authorities learned of the art-
work's sexually explicit themes. Id.
387. Performance artist Karen Finley asserted, "There are artists right now who
are changing their art because they are scared." Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art
and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1373 n.105 (1990) (quoting Tele-
phone Interview with Karen Finley, performance artist (Aug. 1989)).
388. Interview with Bernard James, Professor of Constitutional Law, Pepperdine
University School of Law (Feb. 6, 1992).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Letter from John D. Frohnmayer to Susan Wyatt, Director of Artists Space
(Nov. 3, 1989). "Artists Space" is a well-known New York artist-run gallery. The
show, "Witnesses: Against Our Vanishing," involved 23 different artists and was organ-
ized by Nan Goldin, a prominent Boston photographer and artist. William H. Honan,
Arts Endowment Withdraws Grant for AIDS Show, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al.
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Frohnmayer referred to "the recent criticism the Endowment has
come under and the seriousness of Congress' directive." Further, he
wrote, "[W]e must all work together to ensure that projects funded
by the Endowment do not violate either the spirit or the letter of the
law."392 The reaction to Frohnmayer's decision was extremely nega-
tive among members of the art community, civil libertarians, and ar-
dent First Amendment supporters.393 Susan Wyatt, Director of
Artists Space, characterized Frohnmayer's decision as "a very dan-
gerous precedent. We did a show of Eastern European art here last
June, and I know what official art is all about, and I just hope we are
not moving into that."394 First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams
argued that "Ithe withdrawal of funding] of artistic works because
the catalogue for those works criticizes public officials and other
prominent figures is an appalling surrender of First Amendment
principle."395
In the summer of 1988, North Carolina Republican Senator Jesse
Helms introduced a bill to Congress that would forbid the NEA from
funding projects depicting "sexual or excretory activities or organs"
in a "patently offensive way."396 The new law, which bars funding of
obscene or pornographic artworks, represents the first congressio-
nally imposed content restriction in the NEA's twenty-five year his-
tory.3 9 7 Unfortunately, efforts to censor artists by means of the NEA
funding process are only part of the movement among conservative
politicians and religious fundamentalists to control the content of
popular music, television and radio broadcasts, public school text-
392. Honan, supra note 391, at Al.
393. William H. Honan, The Endowment v. the Arts: Anger and Concern, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1989, at C33.
394. Honan, supra note 391, at Al.
The conservatives' attempt to publicly stigmatize art which is outside of the politi-
cally correct mainstream can be analogized to the "Exhibition of Degenerate Art,"
which propagandist Josef Goebbels organized in Nazi Germany in 1937. In that in-
stance, the Nazis seized 5,000 sculptures and paintings, of which 700 were exhibited
and labeled "degenerate" because they failed to endorse National Socialist Ideas. The
artwork included paintings by Chagall, Dada, Gauguin, Kandinsky, Klee, Mondrian,
and Picasso. IAN DUNLOP, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW 224-59 (American Heritage Press.
1972).
395. William H. Honan, The Endowment v. the Arts: Anger and Concern, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1989, at B13.
396. Id. The bill passed the Senate 68 to 28. Id.
397. Particularly, the law restricts the funding of works which are "considered ob-
scene, including but not limited to portrayals of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the
sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
H.R. CON. RES. 264, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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books, and other forms of expression.3 98 Controversy also continues
over the use of the human body as a visual symbol in paintings, pho-
tography, videos, and film.399 For example, in the fall of 1989, many
removed copies of Vogue and other women's magazines from news-
stands in response to objections to a female nude body shown in an
advertisement.400 Producers of the Today show refused to air a seg-
ment which included a shot of Bronzino's An Allegory with Venus
and Cupid, upon determining that the showing of a female's bare
breast "was not in good taste." 40 ' And in December 1991, Music Tel-
evision (MTV) banned Madonna's video, "Justify My Love," because
it revealed too much of her body.402
Hence, the chilling effect of legislation, coupled with the move-
ment among some conservative politicians and members of the pub-
lic, could further suppress artistic creation across the country. Just
as the Supreme Court decided in Rust v. Sullivan403 that clinics
which accepted federal funding may compel their employees to with-
hold information from their patients regarding abortion as an alter-
native,404 it is not far-fetched to imagine art-funding groups telling
artists that they will not receive monetary support if the artist pro-
duces sexually explicit work.40
398. See Jon Pareles, Legislating the Imagination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at
H30; Chuck Phillips, Are Church Groups Allying for Anti-Rock Crusade?, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1990, (Calendar) at 75.
399. Don't Look Now, VOGUE, Feb. 1991, at 318-21.
400. Id. at 320.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
404. Id. at 1772.
405. One commentator characterizes the Rust and Barnes decisions as signs of an
"increasing willingness by the Court to find excuses to stop free speech." Alexander
Cockburn, Black Robes and Judicial Brass Knuckles: The Supreme Court is Steadily
Infringing on the First and Fourth Amendments, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 27,1991, at B7. An-
other commentator contemplated:
While an art museum has no right to receive a federal grant, what if Congress
prohibited the NEA from giving grants to art exhibits by Republicans? Or to
plays that portray religions other than Christianity in a positive light: Should
the government be able to ban federal grants for productions of "Jesus Christ
Superstar" or Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice," which offends various
religious groups? Or, as one NEA official asked in response to Senator Helms'
proposal, should funding be cut for Mozart's great opera "Don Giovanni" be-
cause it contains a speech extolling the virtues of war which would not doubt
offend devout Quakers?
Eric B. Schnurer, The Troublesome First Amendment, CHRONICLE, Winter 1990 (pub-
lished by the National Constitution Center).
In Rust, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the government's power to advance a
specific social interest outweighs First Amendment protection when federal funds are
involved. The only significant distinction between Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Rust
and Barnes is the manner in which he treats the issue of governmental funding. Joe
Patrick Bean, Trouble Ahead for the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Jul. 8, 1991, at 18.
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Nonetheless,, artists have been fighting back against congressional
attempts to "purify" their artwork. Since October 1989, the NEA has
required artists to sign an "artistic loyalty oath" pledging that if they
receive monetary funding, their art will not violate anti-obscenity re-
strictions.406 Joseph Papp, director of the New York Shakespeare
Festival, refused to sign the oath, and thereby sacrificed a $50,000
grant.407 Papp wrote to NEA President Frohnmayer, "I cannot in all
good conscience accept any money from the NEA as long as the
Helms-inspired amendment on obscenity is part of an agreement." 408
Further revealing his disappointment in the trend toward artistic
censorship in this country, Papp commented, "If you look at foreign
countries where dictatorships prevail, you find that the writers, the
musicians, the artists are either under surveillance or under attack.
The arts are always the first to be hit. The only difference is now it's
happening here."409
B. Legal Significance
1. Impact on Future Cases
Although the plurality in Barnes stated that nude dancing is ex-
pressive conduct within the realm of First Amendment protection, it
specified that it is "only marginally so."410 The plurality further
eroded the Constitution's protections for expressive behavior by em-
phasizing that any First Amendment interest may be outweighed by
"substantial government interest in protecting order and moral-
ity."411 The decision elicits the fundamental question: Who deter-
406. William H. Honan, Papp Rejects Grant from Endowment Over Restrictions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at B1.
407. Id.
408. Id. Television producer Mark Goodson offered to make up Papp's $50,000
grant because he believed that "[t]his thing went right to the heart of something I feel
very strongly about, which is censorship of plays. Half the things that have been done
on Broadway-David Mamet's work, for instance--could be blocked out in an attempt
to skirt someone's definition of what is or is not obscene." Allan Parachini, Venice
Choreographer Refuses $50,000 NEA Fellowship Over Obscenity Limits, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1990, at FLO.
409. Some Voices on the Arts, SEATLE TIMEs, July 22, 1990, at Li.
410. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2456, 2460 (1991).
411. Id. at 2462. Ironically, as one entertainment executive has declared, "[T]here is
no evidence that any type of censorship or repression of free speech increases moral
behavior. All of the evidence shows the opposite." Look Who's Talking: The First
Amendment in Crisis: Arts and Entertainmen a Colloquium Presented by the Play-
boy Foundation, PLAYBoY, April 1991, at 49 (quoting interview with Danny Goldberg,
President, Gold Mountain Entertainment) [hereinafter Look Whos Talking].
In discussing post-World War II censorship of anti-Semitic speech in the Soviet
1391
mines which forms of expression are permissible under the "public
morality" test? If Justice Rehnquist's logic is extended, Barnes could
enable the Court to revisit other cases in which the Court protected
symbolic speech.41 2
For example, if the Court balanced the value of flag burning
against the state interest in order and morality, the Court could over-
turn United States v. Eichman413 and Texas v. Johnson414 on the
grounds that such conduct is highly offensive to society's moral
views.415 Ironically, just two short terms ago in Johnson, the Court
reaffirmed its belief that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable."416
Cohen v. California417 is yet another decision which Barnes may
threaten. There, the Court held that the state could not penalize a
Vietnam War protester who entered a courthouse wearing a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft," because his action was protected
symbolic expression.418 The Court could overturn this decision, if
considered under the logic of Barnes, in order to protect state order
or morality interests.419
Further, Barnes leaves open the question of whether sexually ex-
plicit artwork may be displayed in museums and galleries.420 Hence,
Union, Goldberg notes that the United States took a very different approach to the is-
sue. The U.S. not only allowed this type of speech, but permitted Nazis to march in
public. He concluded that "forty or fifty years later, it's a lot safer to be a Jew in the
United States with free speech than in the Soviet Union that censored anti-Semitism
for forty years." Id. at 49-50.
412. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Bare Minimum of Free Speech, The Nude Dancing Case
Might Lead to a Narrowing of Protected Ex-pression, THE RECORDER, Jul. 19, 1991, at 5.
As one commentator has noted, "Four of the five justices in the majority employed
language that could form the basis for further restrictions on expressive conduct
deemed offensive to society's moral views." Id. Thus, fervent First Amendment sup-
porters are strongly depending on the fact that Rehnquist's "morality" language did
not receive a majority of the justices' vote.
413. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (5-4 decision).
414. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (5-4 decision).
415. Taylor, supra note 412, at 5.
416. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
417. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
418. Id. at 26. The Cohen Court reiterated:
To many, the immediate consequences of this freedom may often appear to be
only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are ... nec-
essary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open
debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with ver-
bal cacophony is ... not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose
sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying
instance of individual distasteful abuse of privilege, these fundamental societal
values are truly implicated.
Id. at 24-25.
419. Taylor, supra note 412, at 5.
420. Martin Garbus, The Big Chill on Free Speech, NEWSDAY, Jul. 4, 1991, at 63;
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Cincinnati city officials might have been able to shut down Robert
Mapplethorpe's artistic photo exhibit because its homoerotic images
could be construed as morally offensive.421 Moreover, the artistic
community should be alarmed because Justice Rehnquist's decision
mentions no exceptions for ballet or theatrical productions which
include nude scenes.422 As one acclaimed constitutional law pro-
fessor has noted, "[I]n effect, Barnes indirectly expands obscenity law
by preferring an outcome-the downgrading of offensive but non-
obscene expression to unprotected status-but without the precision
ordinarily required to avoid a chilling effect on protected
expression." 42 3
2. Court's Conservative Trend
The Barnes decision provided yet another example of how the re-
placement of Justice William Brennan with Justice David Souter has
made a significant impact on the law.424 Moreover, Barnes' language
is even more frightening in light of Justice Thurgood Marshall's re-
tirement in 1991.425 In Marshall's final opinion on the Court, he
railed against his colleagues' "far-reaching assault" on the Bill of
David G. Savage, Ban on Nude Dancing Backed by High Court; Judiciary: The 5-4 De-
cision Says Public's 'Moral Disapproval' Outweighs the Right of Free Expression, L.A.
TIMES, Jun. 22, 1991, at Al.
421. Rita Ciollo, Case Clothed: Ban Upheld on Nude Dancing; Supreme Court OK's
Indiana Law; Critics See First Amendment Peril, NEWSDAY, Jun. 22, 1991, at 7. Artists
are unsure if their work will fall within First Amendment protection because the
Barnes decision voices no true basis for determining whether a piece of art may be
banned because it contravenes society's morals. Bernard James, Justices Still Seeking
a Consistent Voice on First Amendment, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S4; see also Ste-
phen F. Rohde, Art of the State: Congressional Censorship of the National Endowment
for the Arts, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 353, 358-73, 393-93 (1990).
422. David G. Savage, Ban on Nude Dancing Backed by High Court; Judiciary: The
5-4 Decision Says Public's 'Moral Disapproval' Outweighs the Right of Free Expression,
L.A. TIMES, Jun. 22, 1991, at Al. Thus, a future Court could deny First Amendment
protection to such artistic theatrical productions as "Hair," or "Salome," the Richard
Strauss opera featuring the "Dance of the Seven Veils."
423. Bernard James, Reading Between the Lines: The First Amendment, Govern-
ment Regulation and the Rehnquist Court, Los ANGELES LAWYER, Vol. 14, No. 9, Dec.
1991, at 26, 30.
424. Because Justice Brennan was considered a "friend of free speech," he most
likely would have struck down the Indiana statute. Thus, with Justice Brennan's vote,
the Barnes Court would have reached the opposite conclusion. Martin Garbus, The Big
Chill on Free Speech, NEWSDAY, July 4, 1991, at 63.
425. Linda Greenhouse, The Conservative Majority Solidiftes, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30,
1991, § 4, at 1. In one of Justice Thurgood Marshall's last dissenting opinions he cau-
tioned that the Rehnquist majority fired a "far-reaching assault upon this Court's
precedents." Id.
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Rights, characterizing it as the squandering of "the authority and the
legitimacy of this Court as a protector of the powerless." 426 In re-
sponse to a 6-3 ruling which overturned two cases decided merely two
and four years earlier, Marshall wrote, "Power, not reason, is the
currency of this Court's decision-making." 42 7 Hence, the Rehnquist
Court seems willing to chip away at precious constitutional freedoms
which were established to protect all Americans, not merely the ones
speaking in sync with the political majority.4 28
Legal scholars share Justice Marshall's frustration. Catherine
Stimpson, Dean of Rutgers University Graduate School, has warned
that "the sex police are on the beat."429 Other legal scholars have
commented on Justice Rehnquist's judicial activism demonstrated by
outcome of Barnes. Professor Burt Newborne of the New York Uni-
versity School of Law said, "Five years ago, Rehnquist would have
foamed at the mouth if the liberal wing was doing this."430 The
new conservative Court should give credence to one commentator's
declaration that "you cannot claim the higher moral ground by sup-
pressing arguments, rewriting history, and legislating away
behavior."43 '
VI. CONCLUSION
For more than four decades, the American people have relied upon
the High Court to protect and preserve the First Amendment's free-
dom of speech clause against political encroachment. Unlike elected
officials, who are pressured by high-powered interest groups with
their own political agendas, the public traditionally relies upon the
Supreme Court as the shield that protects our nation's fundamental
426. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
427. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Payne, the majority ignored its 1987 decision
in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and its 1989 decision in South Carolina v.
Gather, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), which held that prosecutors at sentencing hearings could
not introduce evidence of the character of a murder victim or the effect of the crime
on the survivors. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that adher-
ence to precedent "is the preferred course, [but] not an inexorable command." Id. at
2609. He justified his reasons for ignoring the doctrine of stare decisis by pointing out
that the Payne case did not involve "property or contract rights" where adherence to
High Court precedence is imperative. Id.
428. Jeffrey Davis, The War on Nudity Part Two: The Supreme Court Considers
the Art of Striptease, PLAYBOY, July 1991, at 42. The author was convinced that the
Warren and Burger Courts would have denied certiorari to Barnes. Id. at 45.
429. Look Who's Talking, supra note 411, at 48 (quoting Interview with Dean Cath-
erine Stimpson). Dean Stimpson referred to a "cultural war" targeted against those
who challenge sexually oriented statutes. She observes that "[o]bscenity has replaced
communism as the demon of choice for rigid and fearful Americans." Id.
430. Marcia Coyle, Complete Control, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at § 1. Professor
Newborne was perturbed by "the hypocrisy with which the Chief Justice has waged a
lifelong war against judicial activism and then does it once he gets five votes." Id.
431. John Allemang, A New Puritanism for the Nagging 90's: Taking the Fun Out
of Practically Everything, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, May 1991, at 30, 32.
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freedoms. Unfortunately, the retirements of Justices William Bren-
nan and Thurgood Marshall have allowed the Court to lower its pro-
tective shield.432 Moreover, the addition of Justices David Souter and
Clarence Thomas could even further erode First Amendment
protections.433
The next decade poses an ominous question: Will freedom of ex-
pression and artistic creativity flourish abroad and dwindle in our
own country? As totalitarian governments lose control over the
minds of their people, will our own government further tighten its
grasp on what our citizens are able to see or read?
The answer may be found not in the United States Constitution,
but in the fifty state constitutions throughout the country. As Jus-
tice William Brennan stated, "Rediscovery by state supreme courts of
the broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state con-
stitutions ... is probably the most important development in consti-
tutional jurisprudence of our times."434 It has long been settled that
the United States Supreme Court will not review any case decided on
independent and adequate state grounds as long as states do not offer
fewer rights than are in the federal Constitution.435 Thus, as a prac-
tical matter, the United States Constitution establishes "a floor for
civil liberties protections, but not a ceiling."436 Therefore, liberal
state courts have the ability to issue decisions that go considerably
beyond current Supreme Court interpretations.437
The Supreme Court's decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. may
seem somewhat trivial at first glance. However, its potential chilling
432. The Court is left with no outspoken liberals and only two moderates, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens. David G. Savage, The Rehnquist Court, L.A. TIMS MAGAZINE,
Sept. 29, 1991, at 38.
433. "[Clarence Thomas'] arrival is likely only to accelerate the urge to purge past
decisions .... Thomas [gives the conservatives] yet another potential ally on a Court
with no diehard liberals and but two moderates." Bos Cohn & David Kaplan, Supreme
Conservatism, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991, at 56.
Another commentator observes, "The confirmation of Clarence Thomas has created
one of the most ideologically homogeneous high courts in this century and the possibil-
ity that there will be fewer of the ringing dissents on which law is often built." Kevin
Cullen, In Court's Turn Right-Few Detour Signs, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1991, at 1.
434. Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, The Methodology, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29,
1986, at S8. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
435. David Margolick, State Judges are Shaping Law that Goes Beyond Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1982, at Al.
436. Id.
437. For example, Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania have held that their
constitutions protect speech occurring on private property such as shopping centers
and universities. Id
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effect could have detrimental repercussions not only on the art com-
munity, but on free speech generally.
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